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ARTICLES
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, JUDICIAL
DISCRETION, AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Bradford K Clark*
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court recently resolved a long-standing split in its
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence when it declared that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause gives federal courts broad discretion to exercise "independent judgment" to evaluate the propriety of
punishments authorized by state law. Five Justices claimed authority
to displace a punishment-however widely employed-based on their
own subjective assessment of the penological effectiveness of the punishment and the moral culpability of the particular class of offenders.'
Notably, these Justices did not attempt to justify their approach in
terms of either the text or history of the Eighth Amendment. The
remaining Justices read the Clause more narrowly to allow judges to
invalidate punishments only when there is objective evidence of a societal consensus against them. Although the Court's ruling represents
an important Eighth Amendment precedent, its resolution of the underlying methodological issue raises a more fundamental question
about the proper scope ofjudicial discretion under the constitutional
structure. Specifically, the Court's assumption of broad discretion to
displace state law is in substantial tension with the implications of con© 2006 Bradford R. Clark. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I thank Rachel
Barkow, A.J. Bellia, Curtis Bradley, David Fontana, Jack Goldsmith, Philip
Hamburger, Bill Kelley, John Manning, John McGinnisJon Molot, Henry Monaghan,
Caleb Nelson, Adrian Vermeule, Art Wilmarth, John Yoo, and my colleagues at GW
for helpful comments and suggestions:
1 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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stitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures, the political safeguards of federalism, and the Supremacy Clause. Historically,
proponents of broad judicial discretion have invoked specific constitutional provisions in favor of such discretion, while opponents have invoked the constitutional structure against such discretion. In several
important historical episodes-involving federal common law crimes
and general law under the Swift doctrine-the Court first embraced
broad policymaking discretion and then abandoned such discretion
in the wake of sustained criticism that the judiciary had exceeded its
role under the constitutional structure. The resolution of these historical controversies-supported by key aspects of the constitutional
structure-counsels against interpreting the Eighth Amendment to
delegate broad policymaking discretion to courts absent clear textual
and historical evidence to the contrary.
The issue initially arose almost fifty years ago when a plurality of
the Court announced in Trop v. Dulles2 that the Eighth Amendment
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."' 3 Over time, members of the
Court came to embrace two competing approaches for identifying
such evolving standards. Thompson v. Oklahoma4 and Atkins v. Virginia,5 on the one hand, suggest that the Eighth Amendment embodies a broad delegation to the Court to exercise its own independent
judgment about the moral and penological propriety of capital punishment in various circumstances. Stanford v. Kentucky, 6 on the other
hand, suggests that the Court must examine objective indicia to ascertain whether, in fact, a punishment has become "unusual" in the sense
that a large proportion of states have rejected its particular application. Last Term, in Roper v. Simmons,7 the Court broke the impasse by
overruling Stanford and embracing "the idea that this Court is required to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class of crimes or
offenders."8
The Supreme Court did not attempt to tie its embrace of broad
judicial discretion to the original understanding or even to a close
historical analysis of the Eighth Amendment. In this sense, the Court
seemed to embrace such discretion as an inherent part of the judicial
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Id. at 101 (plurality opinion).
487 U.S. 815 (1988).
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551.
543 U.S. 551.
Id. at 574.
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power. Questions about the propriety of such discretion are hardly
novel. During the ratification debates, for example, Antifederalists
charged that Article III would allow federal courts "to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter."9 Federalists countered with assurances
that the judiciary would be the "least dangerous" branch 1 0 because the
Constitution would prevent "an arbitrary discretion in the courts"' by
2
confining them to the exercise of 'Judgment" rather than "will.'
The Constitution was ratified based in part on these assurances.
The current debate among the Justices over the scope of judicial
discretion under the Eighth Amendment goes to the heart of our constitutional structure. By failing to tie its approach to the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has in effect
adopted a conception of the judicial power that allows judges to act as
independent moral agents rather than as mere conduits of society's
value judgments. The question the Court must ask, therefore, is
whether its approach is consistent with a proper understanding of the
constitutional structure. Two historical examples may shed light on
this question. In both instances, federal courts first embraced broad
judicial discretion and then abandoned it as inconsistent with the constitutional structure.
First, early in the nation's history, the judiciary took it upon itself
to recognize and enforce federal common law crimes. Federalists
generally defended the practice as an inherent part of "the judicial
Power of the United States,"13 while Jeffersonian Republicans charged
that the doctrine "would confer on the judicial department a discretion little short of a legislative power."' 14 Although almost all members
of the Supreme Court initially embraced federal common law crimes,
the Court ultimately rejected the practice as contrary to the constitu15
tional system of checks and balances.
9

Essays of Brutus No. XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2
417, 419 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).

THE COMPLETE

ANTI-FEDERALIST

10

THE FEDERALIST

No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).
11 Id. at 471.
12 Id. at 465.
13 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1106-07 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (reporting Justice James Wilson's charge to a federal grand jury
that "the common law" had been "received in America," that "the law of nations" to
"its fullest extent has been adopted by her," and that "infractions of that law form a
part of her code of criminal jurisprudence").
14 James Madison, Report on the [Virginia] Resolutions, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON

15

341, 380 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).

See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).

NOTRE

1152

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 81:4

Second, in Swift v. Tyson, 16 the Supreme Court claimed authority
under Article III to displace state law in favor of so-called general
law-that is, law found independently by the Court in light of the general practice of American and foreign courts. 17 After applying and
expanding the Swift doctrine for almost a century, the Court ultimately held in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkinsi8 that the doctrine
amounted to "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of
the United States."'19 According to Erie, various aspects of the constitutional structure prevent federal courts from making law on behalf of
the United States, and thus foreclose Swift's interpretation of Article
111.20

These historical instances of judicial discretion and retreat illustrate several interlocking features of the constitutional structure designed to check federal power and preserve the governance
prerogatives of the states. The Supremacy Clause recognizes only
three sources of law-the "Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties" of the
United States-as "the supreme Law of the Land." 2 1 The Constitution, in turn, prescribes precise procedures to govern the adoption of
each source of supreme federal law. These procedures ensure the operation of the "political safeguards of federalism" 22 by requiring that
the states or their representatives in the Senate approve each and
every source of law capable of displacing state law. 23 Federal lawmak-

ing procedures also preserve the governance prerogatives of the states
simply by making federal law difficult to adopt. They do so by requiring multiple federal actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism to adopt all forms of "the supreme Law of the Land." Taken
together, these features of the constitutional structure suggest that
substantial policymaking discretion at the federal level should be confined to the political branches.
In light of these specific safeguards, the Supreme Court should
require compelling textual and historical evidence before construing
16

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64

(1938).
17 Id. at 18-19.
18 304 U.S. 64.
19 Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
20 Id. at 78.
21 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
22 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543
(1954).
23 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1342-46 (2001).
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open-ended provisions of the Constitution to authorize judicial lawmaking unchecked by such safeguards. By design, the Constitution
assigns federal lawmaking to actors subject to the political safeguards
of federalism and makes such lawmaking relatively cumbersome. Bicameralism and presentment, for example, give states a voice in the
lawmaking process and prevent the vast majority of federal proposals
from ever becoming law. Construing ambiguous constitutional provisions like the Eighth Amendment to give the judicial branch independent policymaking discretion to displace state law would circumvent
both the letter and spirit of the carefully crafted safeguards built into
the constitutional scheme.
This Article contains four Parts. Part I describes the longstanding split on the Supreme Court as to whether the Eighth Amendment essentially delegates policymaking discretion to judges to invalidate a particular punishment if it offends their own conceptions of
evolving standards of decency. Part II examines the constitutional
structure and the ratification debates regarding the proper scope of
judicial discretion under the Constitution. Part III reviews two prior
cycles ofjudicial discretion in which federal courts first embraced and
then renounced broad policymaking power in the name of the Constitution. Finally, Part IV evaluates the reemergence of judicial discretion in the name of the Eighth Amendment, and concludes that both
the text and structure of the Constitution counsel against construing
the Amendment to give federal courts broad policymaking discretion.
I.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The Eighth Amendment provides that "cruel and unusual punishments" shall not be inflicted. 24 The modern Supreme Court has
long been divided over the proper approach to understanding this
open-textured language. The Court has not purported to rely on the
original understanding of the Eighth Amendment 25 and my analysis
does not attempt to revisit that choice. It is useful, however, at least to
identify several threshold questions in applying the Clause. First, does
it apply only to prohibit certain punishments per se or does it also ban
particular applications of otherwise permissible punishments? In
other words, can a generally permissible punishment (e.g., the death
penalty) be considered "cruel and unusual" as applied to a particular
24

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See Anthony F. Granucci, "NorCruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 842 (1969) (reviewing evidence from the Founding
25

and suggesting that "the cruel and unusual punishments clause was directed at
prohibiting certain methods of punishment" per se).
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type of offender (e.g., a minor) or to a particular type of crime (e.g.,
rape)? Second, is the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments
static or dynamic? In other words, can a court invalidate punishments
today that were permissible in 1791?26 In resolving these questions,
the Court has embraced a broad interpretation of the Clause. In a
series of cases, the Court has held that an otherwise permissible punishment may become "cruel and unusual" when applied to a certain
28
class of offenses 27 or offenders.
Beyond these threshold issues, the Court must decide how to determine whether the application of a particular punishment is "cruel
and unusual." The Court's modern framework originated in Trop v.
Dulles,2 9 a case challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute
providing for forfeiture of citizenship upon conviction of wartime desertion. The Court invalidated the statute, but there was no majority
opinion.3 0 The plurality announced that the Eighth Amendment
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. 3 1 Although Trop cautioned
that the task of interpreting the Constitution "requires the exercise of
26 In construing the Seventh Amendment's right to trial by jury, for example, the
Court traditionally asks whether the litigants would have been entitled to a jury in
1791. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558
(1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
27 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (invalidating the imposition of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for a recidivist offender); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (invalidating the imposition of the death penalty for felony
murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (invalidating the imposition of the
death penalty for rape). But see Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding
imposition of a prison term of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting by a repeat offender); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding imposition of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of
cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (upholding imposition of a forty-year
prison term for possession and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding imposition of life imprisonment for a recidivist offender).
28 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (invalidating execution of offenders under eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (invalidating execution of
mentally retarded offenders); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (invalidating execution of offenders under sixteen). But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361 (1989) (upholding execution of offenders under eighteen), overruled by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (upholding execution
of mentally retarded offenders), overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304.
29 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
30 A plurality held the statute to violate the Eighth Amendment, id. at 87 (plurality opinion), while justice Brennan concurred specially on the ground that the statute
"is beyond the power of Congress to enact," id. at 114 (Brennan, J., concurring).
31 Id. at 101 (plurality opinion).
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judgment, not the reliance upon personal preferences, 3'1 2 the plurality
gave little guidance as to how courts should identify society's "evolving
standards of decency."
Members of the Court have embraced two competing approaches
for identifying such standards. Thompson v. Oklahoma3 3 illustrates the
independent judgment or judicial delegation model. There, the
Court set aside a death sentence imposed on a defendant who committed first degree murder when he was fifteen years old. As in Trop,
there was no majority opinion. The plurality opinion first looked to
"contemporary standards of decency as reflected by legislative enactments and jury sentences,"3 4 and concluded that it would offend such
standards "to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the
time of his or her offense. '3 5 Although acknowledging that "'the
judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the
balance,"' the Thompson plurality nonetheless insisted that "'it is for
us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty"' on a fifteen-year-old offender. 36 In other
words, the Thompson plurality believed that the "authors of the Eighth
Amendment" "delegated" the task of defining the contours of cruel
and unusual punishments "to future generations of judges. '3 7 Thus,
the plurality proceeded to decide, in the exercise of its own indepen32 Id. at 103.
33 487 U.S. 815.
34 Id. at 823 n.7 (plurality opinion).
35 Id. at 830. The plurality noted that in nineteen states, capital punishment is
authorized but no minimum age is specified. Id. at 826-27. Thus, the plurality confined its "attention to the 18 States that have expressly established a minimum age in
their death-penalty statutes." Id. at 829. Because "all of them require that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense," id. at
829-30, the plurality concluded that the objective indicators of contemporary standards disfavored the death penalty for offenders tinder the age of sixteen. Justice
O'Connor concurred only in the judgment and was reluctant to find a national consensus on the issue "without better evidence than we now possess." Id. at 849
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Instead, she concluded "that the sentence in this case
can and should be set aside on narrower grounds than those adopted by the plurality."
Id. Because Oklahoma set no minimum age for the death penalty, there is a
"considerable risk" that the legislature "did not give the question ... serious consideration." Id. at 857. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor concluded that defendants "below
the age of 16 at the time of their offense may not be executed under the authority of a
capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age." Id. at 857-58.
36 Id. at 833 (plurality opinion) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982)).
37 Id. at 821; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (invalidating the
death penalty for the mentally retarded based both on a national consensus against
the practice and on the Court's "independent evaluation of the issue").
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dent judgment, "that such a young person is not capable of acting
'38
with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 39 by contrast, represents the objective consensus model. There, a majority of the Court upheld the imposition
of capital punishment for individuals who were sixteen and seventeen
years old at the time of their offenses. The Court explained that "[i] n
determining what standards have 'evolved,'

. .

. we have looked not to

our own conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American
society as a whole." 40 Accordingly, the Court upheld the sentences at

issue based on "objective indicia" such as "statutes passed by society's
elected representatives."'4 ' A plurality of the Court went even further
by rejecting the "argument that we should invalidate capital punishment of 16- and 17-year-old offenders on the ground that it fails to
serve the legitimate goals of penology. '4 2 The Stanford plurality also
"decline [d] the invitation to rest constitutional law upon such uncertain foundations" as "public opinion polls, the views of interest
groups, and the positions adopted by various professional
associations. "4
Last Term, in Roper v. Simmons, 44 the Supreme Court overruled
45
Stanford and strongly endorsed the independent judgment model.
Significantly, in choosing between these competing approaches, the
Court did not purport to ground its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment either in the constitutional text or in the specific understanding of the text at the time of its adoption or, indeed, at any subsequent point prior to Trop. I take the Court's underlying framework
as my starting point and seek here only to examine the consistency of
the competing approaches with broader implications of the constitutional structure.
38 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 (plurality opinion). Strictly speaking, the plurality's
second step was unnecessary because it merely confirmed what the objective indicators already revealed about contemporary standards of decency. Nonetheless, there is
little doubt that the plurality viewed its independent judgment as the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality.
39 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
40 Id. at 369.
41 Id. at 370.
42 Id. at 377 (plurality opinion).
43 Id. Justice O'Connor, who joined most of the Court's opinion, declined to join
the plurality on these points because she believed that the Court has "a constitutional
obligation to conduct proportionality analysis." Id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).

44

543 U.S. 551.

45

Id. at 574-75.
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The immediate question before the Court in Roperwas the constitutionality of Missouri's death penalty as applied to a seventeen-yearold who committed capital murder. Although the Court considered
the practice of other states and foreign nations, it ultimately relied on
its own independent assessment of the morality and effectiveness of
the juvenile death penalty in a maturing society to invalidate the defendant's sentence. Initially, the Court examined the "objective indicia of consensus, as expressed . . .by the enactments of legislatures

that have addressed the question. ' 46 When the Court upheld the juvenile death penalty in Stanford, twenty-five states permitted such punishment. 4 7 Roper emphasized that since Stanford was decided, "[f] ive
States that allowed the juvenile death penalty.., have abandoned it in
the intervening 15 years-four through legislative enactments and
one through judicial decision" 4 -and none has changed its law to
authorize it. Even with this shift, however, a majority of death penalty
states (twenty out of thirty-eight) 49 and a substantial minority of all
50
states (twenty out of fifty) continued to authorize the practice.
46

Id. at 564.

47 Id. at 562.
48 Id. at 565.
49 Of course, by counting the twelve nondeath penalty states, the Roper majority
could observe that a "majority of States have [sic] rejected the imposition of the death
penalty on juvenile offenders under 18." Id. at 568. The dissent objected to "the
Court's new method of counting." Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. ("None of
our cases dealing with an alleged constitutional limitation upon the death penalty has
counted, as States supporting a consensus in favor of that limitation, States that have
eliminated the death penalty entirely.").
50 Id. at 579 app. A (majority opinion). Roper acknowledged that the states had
been slower to abolish the death penalty for juveniles than the death penalty for the
mentally retarded, but suggested that any difference in the pace of abolition is "counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the change." Id. at 566. Here, the Court
was attempting to rely on Atkins, in which the Court found a national consensus
against the death penalty for the mentally retarded based in part on "the consistency
of the direction of change." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002). Roper's
reliance on Atkins, however, is arguably misplaced. Between 1989 and 2002, sixteen
states abolished the death penalty for the mentally retarded. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
The Atkins Court itself found comparison to the (then permissible) juvenile death
penalty "telling" because, during the same period, "only two state legislatures have
raised the threshold age for imposition of the death penalty." 536 U.S at 316 n. 18. In
addition, Atkins acknowledged that proportionality review tinder evolving standards
of decency "should be informed by 'objective factors to the maximum possible extent,'" id. at 312 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (KennedyJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)), and that "the 'clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted
by the country's legislatures,'" id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331
(1989), overruled by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304).
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If Roper rested solely on such "objective indicia," then
reauthorization of the juvenile death penalty by just a few states would
suffice to shift the balance back in favor of constitutionality. Even one
state could alter the "consistent direction of the change," and a handful of states could shift the balance back to the levels upheld in Stanford and endorsed in Atkins. Perhaps for this reason, the Roper Court
did not rest its decision solely on the purported national consensus
against the juvenile death penalty. Rather, the Court characterized its
"review of the objective indicia of consensus" as merely a "beginning
point" that "gives us essential instruction.'
Roperwent on to explain
that the Justices themselves must ultimately "determine, in the exercise of our own independentjudgment, whether the death penalty is a
disproportionate punishment for juveniles. "52
Turning to this task, the Roper Court took it upon itself to evaluate the sufficiency of "the penological justifications for the [juvenile]
death penalty. ' 53 The Court began by concluding that "[firom a
moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a
minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed. '54 In the Court's view,
"the diminished culpability of juveniles" means that "the penological
justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force
'55
than to adults.
The Court next identified the "two distinct social purposes served
by the death penalty" as retribution and deterrence. 5 6 The Court
opined that "the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as
with an adult," whether "viewed as an attempt to express the community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the
wrong to the victim."

57

With

respect to deterrence, the Court thought

it "unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles '58 because "the same characteristics
that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that
51 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 571.
54 Id. at 570. The Court gave three grounds for its moral judgment. First,
juveniles are more likely than adults to have a "'lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility."' Id. at 569 (quotingJohnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)). Second, "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences
and outside pressures" than adults. Id. Third, "the character of a juvenile is not as
well formed as that of an adult." Id. at 570.
55 Id. at 571.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence." 59 In fact, the Court
went so far as to suggest that the "'likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any
weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually
nonexistent.' -60

Whatever the merits of the Court's substantive judgments about
moral culpability, retribution, and deterrence, the important point for
present purposes is that the Court was willing to determine the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty based on criteria wholly unrelated to the existence of a national consensus against such
punishment. Indeed, the Court expressly claimed that it was free to
depart from the "objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question. ' 61 In effect, Roper interpreted the Eighth Amendment to
delegate broad discretion to the Court to exercise its own independent judgment about the moral and penological propriety of the challenged punishment. Accordingly, in the end, Roper rests on little
more than the subjective opinion of five Justices that "neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the
62
death penalty on juvenile offenders."
So understood, Roper suggests that the Court would not overrule
its decision even if all five states that abandoned the juvenile death
penalty between 1989 and 2005 now reinstated it. Rather, in order to
59 Id.
60 Id. at 572 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)). This
conclusion is somewhat curious in light of the Court's earlier observation that the
defendant in Roper had in fact "assured his friends they could 'get away with it' because they were minors." Id. at 556.
61
Id. at 564.
62 Id. at 572. Interestingly, the most widely noted aspect of the Roper opinion
seems to be its invocation of "the overwhelming weight of international opinion
against the juvenile death penalty." Id. at 578; see, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, 2004 Term-Comment: Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005);John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100
Nw. U. L. REV. 303 (2006);Jeremy Waldron, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Comment:
Foreign Law and the Modern lus GentitIm, 119 HARV. L. RE\,. 129 (2005); Ernest A.
Young, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Comment: Foreign Law and the DenominatorProblem, 119 HAR\V. L. REX'. 148 (2005). The Court observed that "Article 37 of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ...contains an express prohibition on
capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18," Roper, 543 U.S. at
576, and that "the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty," id. at 575. Although Roper acknowledged that in the end such opinion does not control "our outcome," id. at 578, the
Court observed that the "opinion of the world community ... provide[s] respected
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions," id.
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uphold the juvenile death penalty, a future majority of the Supreme
Court would have to conclude-in the exercise of their own independent judgment-that the juvenile death penalty is consistent with
their conceptions of moral culpability, retribution, deterrence, and
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.

63

The propriety of attributing a regime of independent judicial
judgment to an ambiguous constitutional text, of course, is not
unique to the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, that question has arisen
in connection with various aspects of our constitutional tradition. In
each case, the answer depends on a careful assessment of text, history,
and structure. As posed in Roper, however, the question comes down
to whether the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" should be
understood, without specific historical warrant, to delegate to the judiciary the authority to render independent penological judgments capable of displacing the contrary penological judgments of the state
legislatures. The constitutional structure bears on this question because it establishes intricate and precise procedures for adopting federal law capable of displacing state law. Each type of law that results
from those procedures-constitutional amendments, laws, and treaties-is expressly referenced in the Supremacy Clause. Moreover, all
of the relevant procedures share the common feature of providing
express protection for the states through the inclusion of the Senate
in the lawmaking process.
1I.

THE STRUCTURAL PRESUMPTION AGAINST JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Some degree of discretion, of course, is inherent in the judicial
function. 64 It is not unthinkable, moreover, that a constitution would
confer virtually unlimited judicial discretion over certain matters.
The question, however, is whether it is proper to attribute indepen63 Given the Court's approach, stare decisis seems to have little or no bearing on
the Court's willingness to shift ground. Atkins overruled Penly v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989), and Roperoverruled Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), without any
serious consideration of the doctrine. Presumably, this stems from the dynamic nature of the test employed by the Court, which allows-or requires-the Court to reassess whether a given penalty offends the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society every time the question is brought before it. Accordingly, the Court should have little difficulty overruling Roper in the future if it concludes that the decision was erroneous.
64 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) ("'[A] certain
degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial
action."' (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))).
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dentjudicial discretion to open-ended constitutional provisions in the
absence of a specific historical showing that those who drafted and
ratified the provisions in fact understood them to confer such discretion. This question is especially salient with respect to a constitutional
structure like ours, which takes pains to channel federal discretion to
displace state law through complicated procedures designed to safeguard federalism. Therefore, the question raised by the Supreme
Court's recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is this: When the
Court employs a framework that does not rely on the original understanding of the constitutional text, what is the appropriate default position for understanding how courts should ascertain evolving
standards of decency? This inquiry is informed by similar debates
over the appropriate role of judicial discretion under our constitu65
tional structure more generally.
The debate over the permissible scope of judicial discretion
under the Constitution began at the Founding. The Founders carefully crafted the constitutional structure to incorporate a series of
checks and balances that constrain policymaking discretion by federal
actors. These features of the constitutional structure suggest that the
Constitution should not be interpreted to give federal courts unchecked policyrnaking discretion in the absence of a clear delegation
by a specific provision of the constitutional text. Consistent with the
constitutional structure, Federalists specifically assured anxious citizens during the ratification debates that federal courts would be the
least dangerous branch because they would "have neither FORCE nor
WILL but merely judgment."66 Thus, both the Constitution's structure and its history counsel against interpreting the Eighth Amendment to confer substantial policymaking discretion on federal courts.
A.

Structure

The Constitution is carefully structured to restrict both who may
displace state law on behalf of the United States and how they may do
so. Specifically, the Constitution prescribes precise procedures to govern the adoption of all forms of "the supreme Law of the Land"-i.e.,
65 Here, I am suggesting a form of intratextualism or, more precisely, intrastructuralism. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747 (1999) (urging
interpreters to read a word or phrase in a particular clause in light of identical or
similar words or phrases found elsewhere in the Constitution); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Architexture, 77 IND, L.J. 671, 672 (2002) (urging interpreters to "notice key
features of the document-its size and shape, its style and layout, its exterior facades
and interior motifs-whose significance is lost on most lawyers and judges today").
66 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 465.
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the "Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties" of the United States. 6 7 Although different in crucial respects, all of these procedures assign responsibility for adopting "the supreme Law of the Land" solely to
actors subject to the "political safeguards of federalism." 6 These actors include the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives. As Madison explained, the role of the states in their selection
and composition ensures that "each of the principal branches of the
federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of
the State governments. '6 9 In this way, the Constitution is structured
to retard "new intrusions by the center on the domain of the states. ' 70
The Constitution magnifies the effect of the political safeguards
by denying any single federal actor the power to make federal law
unilaterally. Rather, all forms of supreme federal law must be
adopted by the Senate acting in conjunction with at least one other
participant. For example, the Constitution provides that constitutional amendments ordinarily receive the approval of two-thirds of the
House and the Senate and three-fourths of the states. 7 1 Similarly, the
Constitution generally requires federal statutes to be approved by the
House, the Senate, and the President. 72 Finally, the Constitution
specifies that treaties be submitted by the President and approved by
two-thirds of the Senators present. 73 Although the effectiveness of the
political safeguards of federalism has waned over time,7 4 federal lawmaking procedures continue to constrain federal lawmaking by establishing multiple "veto gates, '75 and thus effectively creating a
67 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
68 The political safeguards of federalism refer to the role of the states in the
"composition and selection of the central government." Wechsler, supra note 22,
at
543.
69

70
71
72
73

THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 291.

Wechsler, supra note 22, at 558.
See U.S. CONST. art. V.
See id. art. I, § 7.
See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

74 For example, the Seventeenth Amendment has reduced the states' influence
in the Senate by replacing appointment of Senators by state legislatures with popular
elections. See id. amend. XVII. Changes in constitutional law have also limited the
states' ability to influence the House of Representatives through control over voter
qualifications and districting. See id. amend. XV (race); id. amend. XIX (sex); id.
amend. XXIV (poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (age). Finally, the states' modern practice
of appointing presidential electors on the basis of winner-take-all popular elections
has reduced the role of state legislatures in selecting the President and all but eliminated the possibility that the President will be chosen by the House of Representatives
voting by states.
75 See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 & n.5 (1992).
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supermajority requirement. 76 If any of the specified veto players withholds its consent, then no new federal law is created and state law
77
remains undisturbed.
The constitutional structure suggests, moreover, that the lawmaking procedures prescribed by the Constitution are the exclusive
means of adopting "the supreme Law of the Land." The Senate is the
only federal institution specified by these procedures to participate in
all forms of federal lawmaking. The Founders specifically designed
the Senate to represent the states in the new federal government. By
requiring the participation and assent of the Senate, the Founders effectively gave the states (through their representatives in the Senate)
the opportunity to veto all forms of "the supreme Law of the Land."
As George Mason explained at the Constitutional Convention:
The State Legislatures... ought to have some means of defending
themselves agst. encroachments of the Natl. Govt. In every other
department we have studiously endeavored to provide for its selfdefence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with the means
for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than the
giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent
part of, the Natl. Establishment.

78

76 SeeJohn F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 74-75 (2001); William T. Mayton, The Possibilitiesof Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem,
Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to AdministrativeAgencies, 1986 DUKE L.J.
948, 956; Michael B. Rappaport, Amending the Constitution To Establish Fiscal
Supermajority Rules, 13J.L. & POL. 705, 712 (1997).
77

See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine:Fidelity, Institutional Competence,

and CompensatingAdjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. RE\v. 1733, 1792 (2005) ("A national
government that can act only with difficulty, after all, will tend to leave considerable
scope for state autonomy."). Some commentators and judges have even pointed to
the existence of the political safeguards of federalism as a reason to curtail or eliminate judicial review of the scope of federal powers. See United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 647-51 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ.); id. at 660-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985);JEssE
H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175 (1980);Jesse
H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977). Whatever the merits of this suggestion, see
Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constrainton FederalPower, 71 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 91 (2003), it is undisputed that the political safeguards built into the original

constitutional structure were meant to preserve the governance prerogatives of the
states.
78

James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 7, 1787) (stateOF 1787, at

ment of George Mason), in 1 THE REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
150, 155-56 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS].
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If the federal government were free to displace state law without following constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures, it could deprive the states' representatives in the Senate of their essential role in
79
the lawmaking process.

The composition and role of the Senate were central issues at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787.80 The Convention agreed that
state legislatures would appoint Senators,"' but it initially deadlocked
over the proper basis for representation in the Senate. The large
states favored proportional representation, 8 2 while the small states
sought equal representation. 83 The debate was protracted, and the
issue brought the Convention to the brink of collapse. 8 4 The delegates ultimately broke the impasse by granting the states equal suffrage in the Senate. 85 As Jack Rakove has observed, following these
developments, "no one could deny that the Senate was intended to
embody the equal sovereignty of the states and to protect their rights
of government against national encroachment."8 6
The day after approving the states' equal suffrage in the Senate,8 7
the Convention adopted the Supremacy Clause. 88 The Clause was
originally suggested by supporters of equal suffrage in the Senate as
an alternative to the congressional negative, 9 and reflects an important, if overlooked, bargain inherent in the original constitutional
structure. By conferring supremacy only on sources of law that re79 The Founders understood that the Senate's essential role in the lawmaking
process would not only preserve the governance prerogatives of the states, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison), supranote 10, at 378 ("[T]he equal vote allowed
to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty
remaining in the individual States and an instrument for preserving that residuary
sovereignty."), but also provide an "additional impediment... against improper acts
of legislation," id.
80 See Clark, supra note 23, at 1360-63.
81 Id. at 1359.
82 Id. at 1360.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1362-63.
85 Id. at 1363-64. In exchange, the Convention required bills for raising revenue
to originate in the House. Id. The proponents of equal suffrage even succeeded in
exempting this feature of the constitutional structure from amendment by ordinary
means. Id. at 1366; see U.S. CONST. art. V ("[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.").

86

JACK

N.

RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS

170 (1996).

87 SeeJournal of the Constitutional Convention (July 16, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 78, at 13, 14.
88 See Journal of the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 78, at 21, 22.
89 See Clark, supra note 23, at 1348-55.
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quire the Senate's approval (i.e., the "Constitution," "Laws," and
"Treaties" of the United States), the Supremacy Clause restricts federal supremacy to measures approved by the states' representatives in
the Senate. In other words, the states agreed to the supremacy of federal law (and the corresponding displacement of state law) only on
the condition that the Senate (structured to represent the states)
would have power to veto all forms of supreme federal law. 90 The
Founders understood that these internal constraints would make it
more difficult to adopt supreme federal law, but thought that "[t] he
injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be
amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad
ones." 9 1

The Constitution also places a significant, albeit limited, external
92
check on the exercise of federal lawmaking power: judicial review.
By design, federal courts are independent of the political branches
93
and are given no role in adopting "the supreme Law of the Land.
Influential Founders thought such independence was crucial for the
judiciary to perform its essential function of policing constitutional
bounds against the political branches. As Alexander Hamilton
stressed in Federalist 78, "[t]he complete independence of the courts
90

See id. at 1339.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 444.
92 Although judicial review is well established, Larry Kramer has recently challenged its historical origins. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULA'_R
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court,
2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REv. 4 (2001). Dean Kramer's scholarship has sparked substantial debate. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, UnitaryJudicialReview, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 319 (2003); Philip Hamburger, Law andJudicialDuty, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2003); Robert F. Nagel, Marbury v. Madison and ModernJudicial
Review, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 613, 625-32 (2003); Saikrishna B. Prakash &John C.
Yoo, Questionsfor the Critics ofJudicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. RElv. 354 (2003); G.
Edward White, The ConstitutionalJourney of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REv. 1463
(2003).
93 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Founders considered, but rejected, the idea of
giving Supreme CourtJustices a formal role in adopting federal statutes. The Virginia
Plan originally proposed that a "National Legislature," composed of two branches,
with power to enact laws subject to disapproval by "a council of revision" composed of
"the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary." James Madison,
Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 78, at 17, 21. The proposal failed in part because some delegates objected
that it would give judges too much power in conjunction with judicial review. For
example, Luther Martin explained that because "the Constitutionality of laws.., will
come before the Judges in their proper official character," putting judges on the
Council of Revision would give them "a double negative." James Madison, Notes on
the Constitutional Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2 FARRANt'S RECORDS, supra note
78, at 73, 76.
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of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution." 94 The
courts need both "firmness and independence" 95 in order to serve "as
the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments." 9 6 The alternative-unacceptable to the Founders-was that

"the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their
own powers and that the construction that they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments. ' 97 Instead, the Founders established the judiciary-an independent body with no role in the
lawmaking process-to serve as an outside check against unconstitutional lawmaking. 98 Thus, even if the House, the Senate, and the President all conclude that a proposed law is constitutional, courts must
nonetheless disregard the law if they conclude that it was not "made in
Pursuance" of the Constitution.9 9

Both the internal and external constraints on federal lawmaking
suggest that the Constitution does not authorize courts to exercise the
kind of policymaking discretion entrusted to the political branches.10 0
Such judicial discretion would circumvent the political safeguards of
federalism because federal courts,. by design, are independent of such
safeguards. Allowing federal courts to exercise broad policymaking
discretion would also bypass the requirement that the Senate, in conjunction with other actors, approve all forms of federal law capable of
displacing state law. Finally, unbounded judicial discretion would operate to nullify the check ordinarily provided by judicial review. When
the political branches adopt federal law, the judiciary provides an external check against unconstitutional lawmaking. If federal courts
were free to impose their will on society, there would be no external
94 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 466.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 469.
97 Id. at 467.
98 See id. at 468 ("[W]henever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it
will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the
former.").
99

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180

(1803) ("[I]t is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall
be the Supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the
laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuanceof
the constitution, have that rank."); Clark, supra note 77, at 119-24 (explaining how
the Supremacy Clause supports judicial review).
100 SeeJonathan T. Molot, An OldJudicialRolefor a New LitigationEra, 113YALE LJ.
27, 62-63 (2003) ("Judges are on stronger footing when they purport to be interpreting and applying law-and thus exercising bounded discretion-than when they
seem to be resolving disputes on their own initiative and exercising unbounded
discretion.").
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check on the exercise of such discretion because the courts themselves would judge the constitutionality of their own actions. For the
same reasons that the Founders denied "the legislative body" the opportunity to be "the constitutional judges of their own powers," 10 the
constitutional structure counsels against putting the judiciary in a po2
sition to police the exercise of its own policymaking discretion.11
Given the safeguards established by the Supremacy Clause, it
would be strange to presume that judicial review delegates power to
judges-without explicit authorization in a specific clause-to displace state laws based solely on their own independent judgment of
the appropriateness of such laws. To the contrary, the constitutional
structure suggests that the Constitution entrusts policymaking discretion exclusively to the political branches of the federal government.
The Constitution assigns the judiciary the more limited-but essential-role of ensuring that the political branches do not violate "the
manifest tenor of the Constitution" in the exercise of their policymaking discretion.10 3 Interpreting the Eighth Amendment-or any other
open-ended provision of the Constitution-to assign similar discretion to the courts would undermine key aspects of the Founders' careful design.
B. JudicialDiscretion and the Founding
A crucial exchange during the ratification debates suggests that
prominent Founders understood the constitutional structure to confine judges to the exercise of 'judgment" rather than "will" in declaring "the sense of the law."''1 4 Antifederalists charged that federal
courts under the proposed Constitution would be dangerous because
they would be unaccountable to the people, yet possess wide-ranging
discretion to interpret the Constitution according to their own preferences. Federalists countered that the exercise of such discretion
would be an ultra vires abuse of power. They insisted that federal
courts would be the least dangerous branch because of their limited
role.
101 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 467.
102 As Chief Justice Marshall explained, "it is apparent, that the framers of the
constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as
well as of the legislature." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80. Reading the Constitution not as a constraint on judges, but as a license for them to impose their views on
society, arguably "Would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions." Id.
at 178. Instead of serving as a check against unbridled discretion, the judiciary would
become the very instrument for its exercise.
103 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 466.
104 Id. at 469.
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The issue arose when leading Antifederalists-seeking to prevent
ratification of the Constitution-charged that the judiciary would be
10 5
the most dangerous branch of the proposed federal government.
In a series of essays, Brutus wrote extensively about the dangers of the
new federal judiciary. He began by observing that federal judges "are
to be rendered totally independent, both of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and salaries." 0 6 Such independence was especially dangerous when coupled with the "power to
resolve all questions that may arise on any case on the construction of
the constitution, either in law or equity."'10 7 This combination, he
charged, would enable federal judges to exercise unchecked power
because "in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any
fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution."' 108 Thus,
Brutus "question [ed] whether the world ever saw, in any period of it, a
court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in
' 9
a situation so little responsible."10
The Antifederalists' charges did not go unanswered. Alexander
Hamilton, writing as Publius, countered that "[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution."' 1' 0 Withoutjudicial review by an independent judiciary,
he argued, "all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing.""'1 The need for an independent judiciary did
not mean, as Brutus charged, that the Constitution authorized courts
to exercise unlimited discretion. Rather, Hamilton understood the
judicial function to be much more modest. He explained that to
"avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve
to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes
before them."' 12 Directly contradicting Brutus, Hamilton insisted that
federal courts would "have neither FORCE nor WILL but merelyjudg105

As one commentator put it, "we may fairly conclude, we are more in danger of

sowing the seeds of arbitrary government in this department than in any other." Letter from the Federal Framer (Jan. 18, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 9, at 315, 316.
106 Essays of Brutus No. XI, supra note 9, at 417-18.
107

108
109

Id. at 419.

Id. at 420.
Essays of Brutus No. XV, N.Y. J., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 437, 437-38.
110 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 466.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 471.
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ment."1 3 For this reason, "the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the
1
Constitution." 14
Hamilton recognized the possibility that unscrupulous judges
might abuse their power, but he thought this argument proved too
much:
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case
of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every
adjudication upon any single statute. The courts must declare the
sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it proved anything, would prove that there ought to be no
15
judges distinct from that body.'

Hamilton believed that the country could avoid the danger of willful
judges by appointing individuals with the requisite skill and integrity.
In this regard, Hamilton saw life tenure and salary protection as
part of the solution rather than as part of the problem. He thought
there would be relatively "few men in the society who will have suffi16
cient skills in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges."'
Moreover, "making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity
of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite
the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge."' " 7 Hamilton argued that a "temporary duration in office" would discourage good
candidates "from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat
on the bench."'" I8 This, in turn, would tend "to throw the administration ofjustice into hands less able and less well qualified to conduct it
with utility and dignity."' 19 Life tenure, by contrast, would attract upstanding individuals less likely to abuse their office by exercising will
instead of judgment.
Although the Founders disagreed over the magnitude of the danger posed by judicial independence, the exchange between Brutus
and Publius reveals that they were united in their understanding that
it would be an abuse of power for federal judges to "substitute their
113
114

Id. at 465.
Id.

115

Id. at 468-69.

116
117

Id. at 471.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 471-72.
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own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature."'' 20
Thus, both the constitutional structure and the Founders' understanding of Article III suggest that the Constitution "did not grant
judges the right to exercise their own unlimited discretion or will instead ofjudgment."' 2' To the contrary, those who ratified the Constitution expected judges to act with integrity and restraint as "the mere
instruments of the law."'

22

Although the Founders' expectations

themselves are not necessarily authoritative, they correspond quite
closely with the understanding of judicial power that later became
firmly entrenched within our constitutional traditions.
III.

HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION

The permissible scope of judicial discretion under the constitutional structure is an issue that has periodically divided the polity. In
two prominent instances raising the issue, the Supreme Court-and,
indeed, the legal community more broadly-concluded after substantial debate that courts should not be presumed to possess such discretion. The Founders understood that the Constitution, like all laws,
contained ambiguities that could only be settled over time. 123 As
James Madison explained: "All new laws, though penned with the
greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until
their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular
discussions and adjudications."' 124 In two of the most prominent historical "discussions and adjudications," the Court adopted an under120

Id. at 468-69.

121 Todd D. Peterson, Restoring StructuralChecks on JudicialPower in the Era of ManagerialJudging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 41, 53 (1995).
122 Chief Justice Marshall, who participated in the Virginia ratifying convention,
reflected the Founders' sentiments some years later in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824):
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When
they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when
that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is
never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge;
always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in
other words, to the will of the law.
Id. at 866.
123 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1729 (2004) (explaining that "open questions
about 'the judicial Power' came to be settled by practical exposition of the proper
role of the courts in our constitutional system").
124 THE FEDERALIsT No. 37 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 229.
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standing of our constitutional scheme that is squarely at odds with the
notion of delegated judicial discretion to displace state law-discretion of the sort that the Court now claims for itself under the Eighth
Amendment. In each case, the judiciary initially embraced judicial
discretion only to later reject it emphatically as inconsistent with the
constitutional structure.
A.

Federal Common Law Crimes

Following ratification, the first Congress established lower federal
courts and specified their jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.125
The following year, Congress adopted the Crimes Act of 1790,126
which established a handful of federal crimes and their respective
penalties. 12 7 The Crimes Act, however, left large gaps in the federal
penal code. Early federal judges, including most of the Supreme
Court Justices sitting on circuit, tried to fill the void by following the
English practice of recognizing and enforcing nonstatutory common
law crimes. These judges gave little, if any, consideration as to
whether this practice fit within the constitutional structure.
Federal judges originally adopted federal common law crimes in
an attempt to enforce President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793.128 Attempting to keep the United States out of the war
between Britain and France, Washington proclaimed that the federal
government would punish Americans who committed, aided, or abetted hostilities against any of the warring powers. Although there was
no federal statute prohibiting such conduct, Washington gave "instructions to those officers to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions
to be instituted against all persons, who shall . ..violate the law of
nations, with respect to the powers at war.' 1 29 Notwithstanding Washington's proclamation, the French recruited Americans to serve on
125 Ch. 20, 1 Star. 73. The discussion in the text draws in part on Clark, supra note
23, at 1404-12.
126 Ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
127 These crimes included treason, misprision of treason, murder and manslaughter within federal enclaves, misprision of felonies on the high seas or within federal
enclaves, piracy, accessory to piracy before and after the fact, counterfeiting the public securities of the United States, stealing or falsifying federal judicial records, perjury
and subornation of perjury in federal court, bribery of federal judges, obstruction of
federal judicial process, rescuing federal prisoners convicted of capital crimes, prosecuting certain writs or processes against foreign ambassadors and other public ministers, and offering violence to the person of a foreign ambassador or other public
minister. See id. §§ 2-28, 1 Star. at 112-19.
128 Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 430 John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931).
129 Id. at 430-31.
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privateers sailing out of American ports to attack British ships.
Gideon Henfield agreed to serve as the captain of one such privateer,
and was arrested for violating the Neutrality Proclamation after he
captured a British ship and brought it to Philadelphia.' 3 0
Justice Wilson, sitting on the Circuit Court, charged the federal
grand jury in Henfield's Case.13 1 Wilson instructed the grand jury that
"the common law" had been "received in America,"'1 32 that "the law of
nations" to "its full extent is adopted by her," and that "infractions of
that law form a part of her code of criminal jurisprudence."' 3- Accordingly, Wilson instructed that "a citizen, who in our state of neutrality, and without the authority of the nation, takes an hostile part
with either of the belligerent powers, violates thereby his duty, and the
laws of his country."' 3 4 The grand jury returned an indictment
against Henfield.
At trial, Henfield's counsel challenged the court's power to enforce nonstatutory crimes, 35 but Justice Wilson (on behalf of himself,
Justice Iredell, and Judge Peters) unequivocally rejected this contention in his charge to the petit jury:
It is the joint and unanimous opinion of the court, that the United
States, being in a state of neutrality relative to the present war, the
acts of hostility committed by Gideon Henfield are an offence
against this country, and punishable by its laws. It has been asked by
his counsel, in their address to you, against what law has he offended? The answer is, against many and binding laws. As a citizen
of the United States, he was bound to act no part which could injure
the nation; he was bound to keep the peace in regard to all nations
with whom we are at peace. This is the law of nations; not an ex
post facto law, but a law that was in existence long before Gideon
13 6
Henfield existed.
The jury acquitted Henfield without explanation. President Washington quickly urged Congress "to extend the legal code and the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States to many cases which, though
130

Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1110-13 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).

131

Id. at 1099.

132 Id. at 1106.
133 Id. at 1107.
134 Id. at 1108.
135 Id. at 1119 (arguing that "as there was no statute giving jurisdiction, the court
could take no cognizance of the offense").
136 Id. at 1120. For an insightful analysis of Justice Wilson's approach to federal
common law crimes as well as his broader judicial philosophy, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation:John Marshall,James Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling
PopularSovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudencein the New Federal Republic, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 113 (2003).
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dependent on principles already recognised, demand some further
provisions." 137 In response, Congress enacted the Neutrality Act, establishing new statutory crimes expressly prohibiting conduct like
Henfield's.

138

Despite Henfield's acquittal, federal courts continued to enforce
federal common law crimes throughout the 1790s. 139 In fact, it was
not until 1798, in United States v. Worrall,140 that a federal judge even
questioned the legitimacy of federal common law crimes. The case
involved an attempt to bribe a federal Commissioner of Revenue. After the jury found Worrall guilty, his counsel, Alexander Dallas,
"moved in arrest of judgment, alleging that the Circuit Court could
not take cognizance of the crime charged in the indictment.'

14 1

Dal-

las argued that the offense cannot "be said to arise under the Constitution, or laws of the United States" because there was no law
prohibiting Worrall's conduct. 142 Dallas also strenuously challenged
the proposition "that though the offence is not specified in the Constitution, nor defined in any act of Congress; yet, that it is an offence
at common law; and that the common law is the law of the United
States, in cases that arise under their authority.' 1 4 3 Dallas argued that
"[t]he nature of our Federal compact, will not ... tolerate this doc-

trine" because "the very powers that are granted [to the federal government] cannot take effect until they are exercised through the
1 44
medium of a law."'
137
138

(1793).
Ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381 (1794). For an extended discussion of Henfield's Case and its
4 ANNALS OF CONG. 11

aftermath, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Congress,
1793-1795, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 4-16 (1996).

139 See United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714, 714 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 16,122a)
(upholding the indictment and conviction of the Consul from Genoa for sending
anonymous and threatening letters with the intent to extort money, notwithstanding
the defendant's argument that "the matter charged in the indictment was not a crime
by the common law, nor is it made such by any positive law of the United States");
United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147, 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1792) (No. 16,323) (permitting a prosecution for passing counterfeit bank bills of the Bank of the United
States notwithstanding defense counsel's objection that "there was no federal statute
on the subject; hence only an offense of common law").
140 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 384 (1798).
141 Id. at 389.
142 Id. at 390.
143 Id. at 391 (emphasis omitted).
144 Id.; see also id. ("Congress had undoubtedly a power to make a law, which
should render it criminal to offer a bribe to the Commissioner of the Revenue; but
not having made the law, the crime is not recognized by the Federal Code, constitutional or legislative; and, consequently, it is not a subject on which the Judicial authority of the Union can operate.").
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William Rawle, the United States attorney, countered that "it is
unreasonable to insist, that merely because a law has not prescribed
an express and appropriate punishment for the offence, that, therefore, the offence, when committed, shall not be punished by the Cir1' 45
cuit Court, upon the principles of common law punishment."
Justice Chase interrupted Rawle and inquired: "Do you mean, Mr. Attorney, to support this indictment solely at common law? If you do, I
have no difficulty upon the subject: The indictment cannot be main14 6
tained in this Court."'
Justice Chase explained that the Constitution both confers limited powers on the federal government and restricts the manner in
which the government may exercise them. 147 In the case before the
court, Chase acknowledged that the power to punish bribery of federal officials "is certainly included in" Congress's necessary and
proper power. 148 Thus, according to Chase, the question "does not
arise about the power; but about the exercise of the power:-Whether
the Courts of the United States can punish a man for any act, before it
is declared by a law of the United States to be criminal?" 149 Chase
concluded that it is "essential, that Congress should define the offences to be tried, and apportion the punishments to be inflicted, as
that they should erect Courts to try the criminal, or to pronounce a
150
sentence on conviction."
145

Id. at 392.

146 Id. at 393.
147 See id. at 393-94 (stating that "the Constitution of the Union, is the source of
all thejurisdiction of the national government; so that the departments of the government can never assume any power, that is not expressly granted by that instrument,
nor exercise a power in any other manner than is there prescribed").
148 Id. at 394.
149 Id. (emphasis omitted).
150 Id. Judge Peters disagreed, concluding that the United States possesses the
common law "power to punish misdemeanors," and that such power may be exercised
either "by Congress in the form of a Legislative act," or by federal courts "ina course
of Judicial proceeding." Id. at 395. In light of this division of opinion, "the judges
and the Attorney of the District [expressed a wish] that the case might be put into
such a form, as would admit of obtaining the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court,
upon the important principle of the discussion." Id. at 396. Worrall's counsel declined, and the court imposed a mitigated sentence. Commentators debate why Justice Chase agreed to impose a sentence notwithstanding his objections to federal
common law crimes. SeeWILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 147 (1995) (stating that Chase "continued for the rest of his career to reject the
federal courts' authority to try criminal prosecutions based upon the common law");
Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken
Promise of FederalistJurisprudence, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 26, 69 (1978) (suggesting that
Chase's view on the question was "malleable, if not a complete turnaround"); Kathryn
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Ironically, it was the enactment of a federal criminal statute that
set in motion a debate that ultimately forged a consensus both on and
off the Court against the constitutionality of federal common law
crimes. In 1798, Federalists adopted the infamous Sedition Act, which
made it a crime to "write, print, utter or publish ... any false, scandalous and malicious" words about Congress or the President.151 Prior to
the Act, Federalists had used common law seditious libel prosecutions
to punish detractors. Justice Chase's opinion in Worrall the same year
motivated Federalists in Congress to enact legislation. 52 Jefferson
and his party saw the Sedition Act as an attempt to silence political
opposition and challenged its constitutionality.15 The Virginia legislature quickly passed a resolution declaring the Sedition Act to be unconstitutional as an exercise of "a power not delegated by the
Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden
1 54
by one of the amendments thereto."
Federalists like Oliver Ellsworth countered "that the Act
presented no 'constitutional difficulty' because the federal courts
were already authorized to punish seditious libel as a common-law
crime."' 55 Federalists pointed out that the effect of the Act was actuPreyer, Jurisdiction To Punish:FederalAuthority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes
in the Early Republic, 4 LAxW & HIST. REv. 223, 235 (1986) (suggesting that "Chase did
not change his mind on the common law question," and crediting Judge Peters's
account that he "practiced a pious maneuver & [Chase] joined in pronouncing a very
just, but mild Sentence" without realizing "'till too late, that he had pronounced
Judgment with a divided Court'" (quoting Letter from Richard Peters to Timothy
Pickering (Mar. 30, 1816))).
151 Ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596 (1798).
152 See CASTO, supra note 150, at 148 (noting that "[t]his legislation was motivated
in part by Chase's unsettling opinion," which "cast some doubt on the legitimacy of
federal common-law prosecutions").
153 Although the Sedition Act would undoubtedly raise First Amendment concerns today, the Amendment did not obviously apply in 1798 because it "was regarded
as guaranteeing nothing more than the common law definition of freedom of the
press: the freedom to publish without prior restraint." Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound
of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 936 (1992) (citing LEONARD W.
LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 220-349 (1985)). Accordingly, opponents
challenged the Act primarily on the ground that it was beyond Congress's power to
enact.

154 James Madison, [Virginia] Resolutions of 1798, in 6
MADISON,

supra note 14, at 326, 328.

THE WRITINGS OF JAMES

Kentucky passed a similar resolution.

Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 14, 1799), in 5 TE-IF

See

FOUNDERS' CONSTI-

(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987) (declaring the alien and sedition laws to be "palpably against the Constitution").
155 CASTO, supra note 150, at 149 (quoting Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to
Timothy Pickering (Dec. 12, 1798)); see also H.R. REP. No. 110 (1799), reprinted in9
TUTION

117
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ally "to mitigate the undue rigor of the common law, and to give opportunity for the person charged to clear himself by proving the truth
of his assertion."1 56 On this account, the Sedition Act did not
abridge-but actually enlarged-the freedom of speech.
Republicans refocused their attack by denying the central premise of the Federalists' defense: "'that the common or unwritten
law' . . . makes a part of the law of these States, in their united and

national capacity." 15 7 In January 1800, the Virginia Legislature issued
a report, written by James Madison, raising two objections to federal
incorporation of the common law. First, Madison argued that such
incorporation would be inconsistent with the limited and enumerated
powers assigned to the federal government.1 58 The Report stressed
that the federal government is "composed of powers specifically
granted, with a reservation of all others to the States or to the people,"
and then asked: "In what part of the Constitution ...

is this authority

to be found?"'159 After reviewing various provisions, Madison specifically rejected any suggestion that "the common law is ...

adopted or

recognised by the Constitution."' 60 Were it otherwise, he explained,
"the authority of Congress [would be] co-extensive with the objects of
common law." 16 1 "The authority of Congress would therefore be no
longer under the limitations, marked out in the Constitution. They
1 62
would be authorized to legislate in all cases whatsoever."'
Second, and more important for present purposes, Madison argued that federal incorporation of the common law "would confer on
the judicial department a discretion little short of a legislative
2989 (1799) (stating that "the act in question cannot be unconstitutional, because it makes nothing penal that was not penal before, and gives no new
powers to the court, but is merely declaratory of the common law").
156 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 415 (1800) (statement of Rep. Robert Harper); see also
Rowe, supra note 153, at 937 ("In sharp contrast to the common law, the Sedition Act
permitted the accused to offer truth as an affirmative defense.").
157 Madison, supra note 14, at 372.

ANNALS OF CONG.

158 "[T]he nature of the [common] law of England makes it impossible that it
should have been adopted in the lump into such a Government as this is; because it
was a complete system for the management of all the affairs of a country." 9 ANNALS
OF CONG. 3012 (1799) (statement of Mr. Nicholas). As Madison explained, because
Congress's power is coextensive with federal judicial power, recognition of a federal
common law would mean that "Congress would therefore be no longer under the
limitations marked out in the Constitution. They would be authorized to legislate in
all cases whatsoever." Madison, supra note 14, at 380.
159 Madison, supra note 14, at 372.
160 Id. at 382.
161 Id. at 380.
162 Id.
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power." 163 Because such incorporation would "present an immense
field for judicial discretion," it would require the federal judiciary "to
decide what parts of the common-law would, and what would not, be
properly applicable to the circumstances of the United States."' 164 According to Madison, giving federal illa
thi a_..... f A;..tion
' 165
"over the law would, in fact, erect them into legislators."
The Sedition Act expired in 1801, and the debate over federal
common law crimes temporarily subsided with the inauguration of
Thomas Jefferson. 166 Jefferson pardoned individuals convicted during the Adams Administration under the Sedition Act, and stressed his
view that the Act was unconstitutional. 16 7 Jefferson's administration
thereafter avoided the question of federal common law crimes by pursuing "prosecutions of Federalist editors for seditious libel . . .in the
state courts in 1803, 1804 and 1806."168 In 1806, however, Republicans sought to prosecute two Federalist editors, Hudson and Goodwin, for common law seditious libel in federal court, giving rise to the
case in which the Supreme Court would ultimately repudiate federal
common law crimes. 169 The case did not reach the Supreme Court
until 1812. By then, Republican appointees constituted a majority of
the Court for the first time and the public increasingly accepted Republican conceptions of the constitutional structure. Although both
163
164
165

Id.
Id. at 381.
Id.

166 After taking office, Jefferson "discontinued the prosecution against [Federalist
editor] William Duane under the now expired Sedition Act." Preyer, supra note 150,
at 238.
167 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310, 311 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1897) ("But
the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it.").
168 Preyer, supra note 150, at 239. The Republicans' willingness to pursue common law prosecutions in state court underscores the fact that their objections to federal common law crimes were based primarily on the constitutional structure rather
than on a broad view of the freedom of speech.
169 Kathryn Preyer recounts that the controversy began when Connecticut Federalists initiated a prosecution for seditious libel "in the state court (under statutory authority) against the editor of the Jeffersonian Litchfield Witness." Id. at 242.
"Jefferson's newly appointed District Judge in Connecticut, Pierpont Edwards, retaliated by inviting the federal grand jury to return common law indictments for libels
against the President," reminding them that "'[w]hatever may be my own opinion
upon the question, [whether there] are.., any common law offenses recognizable by
the courts of the United States[,] I deem it my duty to declare to you the law, as
pronounced by those judges."' Id. at 242-43 (quoting Hon. Pierpont Edwards, The
Judge's Answer, WITNESS (Litchfield, Conn.), Apr. 30, 1806, at 2).
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the Attorney General and the defendants' counsel declined to argue
the case, the Court proceeded to the merits.
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court and declared
that federal courts lack judicial discretion to recognize and enforce
federal common law crimes. Johnson stated the question broadly as
"whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases. 1 70 Johnson's opinion was
brief, reflecting his view that the question had long been "settled in
public opinion,"' 71 and the "course of reasoning" in support of the
Court's conclusion "is simple, obvious, and admits of but little illustration."1 72 Johnson noted that the Supreme Court alone "possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the constitution." 173 Lower
federal courts, by contrast, "possess no jurisdiction but what is given
them by the power that creates them, and can be vested with none but
what the power ceded to the general Government will authorize them
to confer."' 174 The Court, however, found it unnecessary "to inquire
whether the general Government, in any and what extent, possesses
the power of conferring on its Courts a jurisdiction in cases similar to
the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction has not been conferred
75
by any legislative act."'
Recalling arguments made in earlier cases, 176 Justice Johnson
stated that "[t]he only ground on which it has ever been contended
that this jurisdiction could be maintained is, that, upon the formation
of any political body, an implied power to preserve its own existence
and promote the end and object of its creation, necessarily results to
it.' 7 7 The Court again found it unnecessary to examine "how far this
consideration is applicable to the peculiar character of our constitution.' 7 8 Rather, the Court explained that even if this consideration
were "applicable to the state of things in this country, the conse170 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812).
171 Id. at 32 ("Although this question is brought up now for the first time to be
decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion."); see also id. ("In no other case for many years has this jurisdiction been asserted,
and the general acquiescence of legal men shews the prevalence of opinion in favor
of the negative of the proposition.").
172 Id. at 33.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 384, 395 (1793) (opinion of Peters, J.) ("Whenever a government has been established, I have always supposed, that
a power to preserve itself, was a necessary, and inseparable, concomitant.").
177 Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33.
178 Id. at 34.
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quence [of such implied powers] would not [be the] result.., which
is here contended for.' 1

79

The Court went on to say that "[t]he legis-

lative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a
punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of
18 0

the offence."

Although Hudson & Goodwin rejected federal common law
crimes, the question was not finally settled until four years later in
United States v. Coolidge.18 1 Coolidge began in the Circuit Court in Massachusetts when several defendants were indicted for forcibly rescuing
a prize.' 82 Justice Story, sitting on circuit, posed the question as
"whether the circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction to punish offences against the United States, which have not been previously
defined, and a specific punishment affixed, by some statute of the
United States."' I88 Justice Story "considered the point, as one open to
be discussed, notwithstanding the decision in U.S. v. Hudson," because that decision was "made without argument, and by a majority
only of the court."' 84 Justice Story sought to allay fears of unbridled
judicial discretion by narrowing the range of common law crimes cognizable in federal court. Thus, he purported to ascertain "what are
[the] crimes and offences against the United States" by reference to
"the principles of the common law, taken in connexion with the constitution."18 5 "Without pretending to enumerate them in detail, I will
venture to assert generally, that all offences against the sovereignty,
the public rights, the public justice, the public peace, the public trade
and the public police of the United States, are crimes and offences
against the United States."'1 86 Justice Story concluded that the offense
179

Id.

180 Id. The Court acknowledged that "[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily
result to our Courts ofjustice from the nature of their institution," such as the power
to "fine for contempt-imprison for contumacy-[and] inforce the observance of order." Id. The Court insisted, however, that "all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in
common law cases . . . is not within their implied powers." Id.
181 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
182 Id. at 415.
183 United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
14,857), revd, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415.
184 Id. at 621. Justice Story began by noting that section 11 of the judiciary Act of
1789 gave the circuit courts "'exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States.'" Id. at 619 (quoting ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73,
79 (1789)). Story denied that this jurisdiction is limited to "crimes and offences specially created and defined by statute," id., because the jurisdiction "could not... have
been given in more broad and comprehensive terms," id. at 620.
185 Id. at 620.
186

Id.

1 18o

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

8 1:4

charged-forcibly rescuing a prize-met this test and declared the
proper punishment to be the common law "penalty of fine and
imprisonment."

1'

87

Before Coolidge reached the Supreme Court, Justice Johnson also
had occasion to revisit the question of federal common law crimes on
the Circuit Court. William Butler was indicted for piracy in South Carolina federal court for both common law and statutory crimes. Although the case is unreported, Johnson apparently arranged to have
his opinion printed as a "Pamphlet to the Public."18 8 Johnson's opinion held that the Crimes Act of 1790 did not reach the defendant's
conduct, 18 9 and then proceeded to examine "whether the Courts of
the United States possess common law jurisdiction in criminal
cases." 190 Justice Johnson began by noting that "advocates for this
kind ofjurisdiction... do not contend for the adoption of the entire
system of the Common Law."' 9 1 But this very concession, intended to
alleviate one type of constitutional objection, only served to underscore another. Recalling Madison's objections, Johnson explained
that "if the courts of the United States are to be at liberty to select
such parts [of the common law] as in their judgment are applicable,"
92
then they must "erect themselves into legislators in the selection."'
187 Id. at 621. In the alternative, Story attempted to distinguish Hudson & Goodwin
on the ground that "however broad in its language," the decision did not involve
"offences of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Id. According to Story, "[t]he admiralty is a court of extensive criminal, as well as civil jurisdiction." Id. Although
Justice Story acknowledged that the Judiciary Act gives federal courts express jurisdiction "in civil cases of admiralty jurisdiction, but not in criminal cases," he nonetheless
contended that "criminal cases are necessarily included in the grant of cognizance of
all 'crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States."' Id.
(quoting ch. 20, 1 Stat. at 79).
188 Trial of William Butler for Piracy 3 (C.C.D. S.C. 1813) (copy on file with the
Notre Dame Law Review).
189 Id. at 6-10.
190 Id. at 10.
191 Id. at 21. Apparently responding to justice Story's approach in Coolidge, Justice
Johnson mocked the suggestion that federal common law crimes meaningfully could
be narrowed to "offences, against the sovereignty, the public rights, the public justice,
the public peace, public trade, public police, &c. &c." Id. at 19.
192 Id. at 21. Another passage confirms thatJustice Johnson's objection to federal
common law crimes was based more on judicial evasion of constitutionally prescribed
lawmaking procedures than on a lack of federal power:
Can anyone doubt of the power of Congress under this [Necessary and
Proper] clause, to pass laws, fully commensurate or even surpassing the
Common Law provisions, for the punishment of offences against the sovereignty, rights, justice, peace, trade, or police of the United States? And why
have they not done it in any particular case? Unquestionably, because they
did not think it necessary. Why then should it be competent to the Courts of
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Johnson thought the exercise of this degree of judicial discretion
would be unconstitutional, and concluded "with much regret that we
1 93
thus decide in favor of so flagrant an offender."'
When Coolidge finally reached the Supreme Court in 1816, the
result was anticlimactic. The Attorney General stated that he had "examined the opinion of the court ...in the case of the United States v.
Hudson and Goodwin," that he "consider[ed] the point as decided in
that case."' 19 4 Justice Story responded, "I do not take the question to
be settled by that case." 1 95 Justice Johnson declared, "I consider it to
be settled by the authority of that case."' 19 6 Justice Washington indicated his willingness to consider the question "[w]henever counsel
can be found ready to argue it." ' 19 7 Finally, Justice Livingston stated
that he was "disposed to hear an argument on the point," but that
"until the question is re-argued, the case of the United States v. Hudson and Goodwin must be taken as law."' 9 Justice Johnson then delivered the opinion of the Court, stating simply that in the absence of
argument "the court would not choose to review their former decision
in the case of the United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, or draw it
into doubt."1 99
Although now largely forgotten,2 0 0 the Supreme Court's repudiation of federal common law crimes played a significant role in curbing
judicial discretion under the constitutional structure. Because the
Court resolved the question early in the nation's history, one might
erroneously assume that the practice never had any real support. In
fact, "the Hudson Court disapproved at least eight circuit court cases,
[and] brushed off the views of all but one Justice who sat on the Court
prior to 1804. '' 201 Similarly, because the issue seems fairly narrow today, it is easy to overlook the fact that the debate over federal comthe United States, to assert that it is necessary, and proceed to punish offences against which Congress has not thought proper to legislate? Surely
we should wait until summoned to the aid of the general government, or we
may be deemed officious, forward and intrusive.
Id. at 26-27.
193 Id. at 35.
194 United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 415, 415 (1816).
195 Id. at 416.

196
197
198
199

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

200 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE ACE OF STATUTES 245 n.39
(1982) (noting that "the United States has never had a federal common law of
crime").
201 Rowe, supra note 153, at 920.
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mon law crimes went quite explicitly to the very nature of judicial
power under the constitutional structure both as it relates to the legislative powers of Congress and as it relates to the powers reserved by
the Constitution to the states. The decision to abandon nonstatutory
federal crimes reflects the Court's recognition that the constitutional
structure limits not only the scope of federal power, but also the manner in which the government may exercise such power. More specifically, the rejection of federal common law crimes provides significant
confirmation of the view, embraced by prominent Founders, that the
Constitution requires federal courts to confine themselves to the exercise of judgment rather than will.
B.

The Swift Doctrine

A second-and, to contemporary lawyers, more familiar-controversy further illustrates the settled understanding that the attribution
of open-ended judicial discretion to disregard state law contradicts the
interrelated features of the constitutional structure that govern federal lawmaking and safeguard federalism. The controversy arose in
the nineteenth century from the Supreme Court's application and expansion of so-called "general common law" in diversity cases. Justice
Story was again a central figure. In Swift v. Tyson, 20 2 Justice Story held
on behalf of the Court that federal courts may disregard state court
decisions and exercise independent judgment on questions of general
law. 20 3 Although the Swift doctrine originated with a question of commercial law, it gradually expanded to encompass a wide array of matters traditionally governed by local law. Nearly a century later,
following sustained criticism, the Court declared the Swift doctrine to
be unconstitutional in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 20 4 In so doing,
the Court invoked principles of judicial federalism derived from federal lawmaking procedures, the political safeguards of federalism, and
the Supremacy Clause.

202 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
203 Id. at 19. Art Wilmarth has pointed out that James Wilson-a strong proponent of federal common law crimes-arguably anticipated Swift by advocating a separate branch of equity jurisdiction to develop and apply a uniform mercantile law in
American courts. See Wilmarth, supra note 136, at 163-64.
204 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (explaining that the Court would not ordinarily "abandon a
doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century," but that "the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so").
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The Origins of the Swift Doctrine

Although Swift was arguably defensible when decided, 20 5 it
quickly expanded into "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by
courts of the United States.' " 2 0 6 Swift began as a suit between citizens
of different states that raised an unsettled question of commercial
law-whether acceptance of a negotiable instrument in satisfaction of
a preexisting debt constituted consideration sufficient to confer upon
the recipient the status of "a bond fide holder. '20 7 Although several
prior New York decisions suggested that such consideration was inadequate, 20 8 the Supreme Court exercised independentjudgment to con20 9
clude that release of a preexisting debt was sufficient consideration.
The Court considered the question to be one of "general commercial
law, '2 10 upon which the Court was free "to express our own
opinion."

21

'

205 The following analysis of Swift is drawn in part from my earlier writings on the
case. For further discussion, see Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1245, 1277-92 (1996).
206 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J.,dissenting)).
207 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 16.
208 In Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N.Y. 1822), the New York Court for the
Correction of Errors recognized "[t]he general rule ... that where negotiable paper
is transferred for valuable consideration, and without notice of any fraud, the right of
the holder shall prevail against the true owner," id. at 644-45 (opinion of Woodworth,J.). The court, however, concluded that the defendants in Coddington were not
entitled to the benefit of the rule because they had not given "valuable consideration"
for the notes. Id. at 648. Strictly speaking, the question whether the release of a
preexisting debt constitutes valuable consideration was not presented in Coddington
because the defendants admitted that at the time they received the notes, the persons
from whom they received them "were not, in a strict legal sense, indebted to [the
defendants] in any amount whatever." Id. at 644. Nonetheless, several of the opinions suggested that an antecedent debt is not a valuable consideration tinder the rule.
See id. at 648; id. at 651 (opinion of Spencer, C.J.); id. at 655 (opinion of Viele, Sen.).
Although the Supreme Court for the Correction of Errors had not "pronounced any
positive opinion upon" the question when Swift was decided, see Swift, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) at 18, several lower court decisions had ruled in accordance with Coddington's
dicta, see, e.g., Payne v. Cutler, 13 Wend. 605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835); Rosa v. Brotherson,
10 Wend. 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833); Wardell v. Howell, 9 Wend. 170 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1832). The Court in Swift noted that "the more recent [New York] cases ... have
greatly shaken, if they have not entirely overthrown [the earlier] decisions," 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) at 17, but the Court was willing to assume arguendo that "the doctrine [was]
fully settled in New York" that "a pre-existing debt was not a sufficient consideration
to shut out the equities of the original parties in favor of the holders," id. at 17-18.
209 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19-21.
210 Id. at 18.
211
Id. at 19.
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At the time Swift was decided, states did not clearly consider questions of general commercial law to be governed by local law. Historically, such questions were governed by the law merchant, a branch of
the law of nations. This did not mean, however, that courts were free
to exercise unbridled discretion. Rather, as Blackstone explained, the
law merchant was "a particular system of customs ...

which, however

different from.., the common law, is... allowed, for the benefit of
trade," and "which all nations agree in and take notice of." 2 12 Such
law was traditionally based on the commercial customs and practices
of merchants and was applied by all "civilized" nations to resolve disputes among merchants from different countries. 213 Nations and
states followed the law merchant in order to facilitate international
and interstate trade by establishing uniform rules to govern transac214
tions among diverse citizens.
In the early nineteenth century, both federal and state courts
"considered themselves to be deciding questions under a general law
merchant that was neither distinctively state nor federal." 2 15 For this
212

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

213

See id. at *75 ("[A] particular system of customs . . . called the custom of

1

COMMENTARIES

*75, *273.

merchants, or lex mercatoria... is ... allowed, for the benefit of trade, to be of the
utmost validity in all commercial transactions . .

").

214 See id. at *273 ("[A]s these are transactions carried on between subjects of independent states, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded by the other. For
which reason the affairs of commerce are regulated by .. .the law merchant or lex
mercatoria,which all nations agree in and take notice of."); ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF

NOTES, at ix (Arno Press 1972) (1810) ("In questions of
commercial law, the decisions of Courts, in all civilized, and commercial nations, are
to be regarded, for the purpose of establishing uniform principles in the commercial
EXCHANGE, AND PROMISSORY

world."). See generally Francis M. Burdick, What Is the Law Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L. REV.

470 (1902). William Fletcher puints out that "[t]he concept of a uniform law
merchant was quite naturally imported into the treatment of commercial law by
American courts," William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1518

(1984), because the general common law was regarded at the time as a great "universal law," "regularly and constantly adhered to," 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 212, at *67.
215 Fletcher, supra note 214, at 1554. Swift made this point explicitly: "It is observable, that the Courts of New York do not found their decisions [regarding the adequacy of consideration] upon any local statute, or positive, fixed or ancient local
usage: but they deduce the doctrine from the general principles of commercial law."
Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. On questions of this kind, "the state tribunals are called
upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general
reasoning and legal analogies .... what is the just rule furnished by the principles of
commercial law to govern the case." Id. at 19. At the time, New York courts took the
same approach. For example, in Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N.Y. 1822), the
New York Court for the Correction of Errors recognized "[t] he general rule ... that
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reason, the courts of each sovereign understood themselves free to

exercise independent judgment to ascertain applicable customs and,
when necessary, reach conclusions contrary to the decisions of the
other. For example, in Swift, the Supreme Court looked to "the principles established in the general commercial law," rather than to the
decisions of New York state courts, in deciding a dispute between citizens of different states arising under the law merchant. 2 16 The Court
noted that such decisions "are entitled to, and will receive, the most
deliberate attention and respect of this court; but they cannot furnish
positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments
are to be bound up and governed.

2 17

Likewise, New York courts considered themselves equally free to
disregard the Supreme Court's decisions on questions of general commercial law.2 1 8 Just two years after Swift, counsel urged New York's
highest court to conform its decision "to the opinion of Mr. Justice
Story in the recent case of Swift v. Tyson. '2 19 Although recognizing
that on "question[s] of commercial law, . . . it is desirable that there

should be, as far as practicable, uniformity of decision, not only between the courts of the several states and of the United States, but also
between our courts and those of England," the court declined to follow the rule embraced in Swift and described the Supreme Court as a
"tribunal, whose decisions are not of paramount authority" on such
22 0
questions.
where negotiable paper is transferred for a valuable consideration, and without notice
of any fraud, the right of the holder shall prevail against the true owner." Id. at
644-45 (opinion of Woodworth,J.). The court considered the rule to be "well established," id. at 647, and consistent with "the usual course of trade," id. at 651 (opinion
of Spencer, C.J.). That the court recognized this rule as part of the general law
merchant is suggested by Chief Judge Spencer's observation that the rule "is not only
right in itself, but the contrary doctrine would destroy the circulation of notes, and
would justly alarm the mercantile world." Id.
216 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
217 Id. at 19.
218 See Fletcher, supra note 214, at 1561 ("State courts generally followed common
law decisions by the United States Supreme Court, but they were quite explicit in
stating that they did not do so because of any legal compulsion.").
219 Stalker v. M'Donald, 6 Hill 93, 95 (N.Y. 1843).
220 Id. at 95, 112. Similarly, in deciding a question of general commercial law in
1822, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that "[t]he decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States have no obligatory authority over this court, except in
cases growing out of the constitution, of which this is not one." Wain v. Thompson, 9
Serg. & Rawle 115, 122 (Pa. 1822). Although asserting the right to exercise independent judgment, the court recognized the "importance of preserving uniformity of
commercial law, throughout the United States." Id. Accordingly, Justice Tilghman
stated, "I shall always be inclined to adopt [the] opinions [of the Supreme Court],
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Taken in historical context, the Swift Court arguably did what
New York law instructed-exercise independent judgment to ascertain the applicable rule of customary commercial law. For this reason,
"Swift appears to have been regarded when it was decided"-not as an
unconstitutional assumption of power by federal courts-but "as little
more than a decision on the law of negotiable instruments." 22 1 As
long as New York courts purported to decide interstate commercial
disputes according to a general body of customary commercial law
rather than "local usage," the Supreme Court's approach in Swift was
arguably consistent with the constitutional structure.
2.

The Expansion of the Swi Doctrine

Although Swift may have been defensible when decided, two subsequent developments undermined its constitutional legitimacy. First,
state courts gradually abandoned reliance on the general law
merchant in favor of local commercial doctrines. Thus, even in cases
like Swift, federal courts could no longer disregard state court decisions without exercising independent judgment as to the content of
the law to be applied. Second, federal courts expanded the Swift doctrine to encompass an ever-growing list of legal questions historically
governed by state law. The expanded Swift doctrine allowed federal
courts to exercise an ever-increasing degree of policymaking discretion to decide questions traditionally governed by local law. These
two developments ultimately led Erie to declare the Swfi doctrine to
be unconstitutional.
Following Swift, states increasingly regarded commercial law as an
aspect of local law rather than part of the general law merchant. Both
state courts and state legislatures participated in this shift. State
courts gradually abandoned the ideal of a universal law merchant and
22 2
began to formulate commercial doctrines as a matter of state law.
At the same time, state legislatures enacted specific statutes to govern
commercial transactions in such states. 2 23 As a result, by the end of
the nineteenth century, commercial law varied widely from state to
rather than those of any foreign court, unless when I am well satisfied, it is in the

wrong." Id.
221 Fletcher, supra note 214, at 1514.
222 See Lyman D. Brewster, The Promotion of Uniform Legislation, 6 YALE L.J. 132, 140
(1897) (arguing for "statutory unity rather than Uudicial] diversity, in matters of common interest").
223 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & JOHN HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 5 (4th ed. 1985) ("By 1890 every state had at least one statute on negotiable instruments ....").
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state. 224 The resulting conflicts of law undermined interstate trade
and gave rise to successful efforts to have states enact uniform commercial codes. 2 25 Such codes, of course, were designed to perform
the function previously served by the now defunct law merchant-i.e.,
to encourage interstate trade through uniform commercial law. 2 26
Notwithstanding the states' abandonment of the law merchant, federal judges continued to apply Swift and disregard state court decisions in favor of their own conceptions of general commercial law.
Equally significant, federal courts expanded the Swift doctrine
well beyond its commercial origins to encompass numerous questions
traditionally governed by local law. One of the most significant steps
in this expansion was the Court's decision to disregard state tort law in
favor of so-called "general law." In 1862, in a case concerning liability
for negligence, the Court declared that "where private rights are to be
determined by the application of common law rules alone, this Court,
although entertaining for State tribunals the highest respect, does not
feel bound by their decisions. '22 7 This trend continued and by the
time Erie was decided, federal courts claimed the right to exercise independent judgment with respect to dozens of historically local ques2 28
tions including negligence, punitive damages, and property rights.
Unlike commercial disputes, such matters had never been considered
by states to be governed by general law.
These two developments-the continued application of the Swift
doctrine to commercial questions and its expansion to historically local matters-severely undermined the legitimacy of the Swift doctrine.
Justice Field was one of the first members of the Court to challenge
the constitutionality of the doctrine. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
v. Baugh,229 he denounced the Court's decision to disregard the Ohio
common law of fellow servant liability in favor of so-called "general
law." Although acknowledging that he had applied Swift in the past,
224 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 355 (1973) (stating
that "each state from Maine to the Pacific was a petty sovereignty, with its own brand
of law").
225 See id. ("By 1900, [the uniform Negotiable Instruments Law] had been widely
enacted ....").
226 See Brewster, supra note 222, at 134 ("[G]reat care is taken to preserve the use
of words which have had repeated legal constructions and become recognized terms
in the Law Merchant.").

227 Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 428-29 (1862).
228 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1938) (detailing the expansion of the Swift doctrine); TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANICE: THE SwIFr & ERIE
CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 71 (1981) ("[T]he federal judiciary continued to enlarge the body of general law so that by 1890 it included some 26 doctrines ....
229 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
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Justice Field believed that "there stands, as a perpetual protest against
its repetition, the Constitution of the United States, which recognizes
and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States." 230 Justice Holmes embraced the same position, characterizing the Swift doctrine as "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of
the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opin'23 1
ion should make us hesitate to correct.
3.

The Unconstitutionality of the Swift Doctrine

By 1938, the Swift doctrine had become untenable. Although
neither party asked it to do so, the Supreme Court overruled Swi in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 23 2 According to the Court, "in applying
the [Swift] doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded
rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the
several States." 23 3 Commentators have long debated the precise nature of the constitutional defect found in Erie.234 Careful review sug-

gests that the Court became convinced that the Swift doctrine had
become little more than an excuse for federal courts to exercise will
instead of judgment in contravention of federal lawmaking procedures, the political safeguards of federalism, and the Supremacy
Clause. As discussed below, these considerations suggest that Erie
rests on mutually reinforcing principles of separation of powers and
federalism.
Several alternative constitutional rationales merit only brief discussion. For example, some commentators have suggested that Erie's
constitutional analysis should be considered dictum, and that the decision is best understood to rest solely on the Court's interpretation of
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,235 also known as the Rules of
Decision Act. 236 Although it is true that the Court examined sec-

tion 34 and overruled "the construction given to it by the [Swift]
230 Id. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting).
231 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J.,dissenting).
232 304 U.S. 64.
233 Id. at 80.
234 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcrION § 5.3.5, at 315 (4th ed. 2003)
("The constitutional basis for the Erie decision has confounded scholars."); Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevanceof Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REv. 673, 676
(1998) (noting that Erie's "holding has been subject to disagreement and controversy
over the years").
235 Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000)).
236 See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946).
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Court,"2 3 7

the Court expressly declined to rest its decision on statutory
grounds. According to the Court: "If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the
unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear
and compels us to do so."238 Thus, according to the Court, the constitutional rationale was necessary to support the judgment.
Other commentators have suggested that the equal protection
"component" of the Fifth Amendment supplies a plausible basis for
the Supreme Court's decision in Erie,239 relying on the Court's statement that "the [Swift] doctrine rendered impossible equal protection
of the law." 240 First, the structure of the Court's opinion appears to
foreclose this reading. Erie's reference to "equal protection" appears
in a preliminary section of the opinion describing the "political and
social" defects of the Swift doctrine rather than the section specifically
explaining "the unconstitutionality of the course pursued.

'24 1

Sec-

ond, at the time Erie was decided, the Court had not yet interpreted
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to (reverse) incorporate
an equal protection component applicable to the federal government.2 42 The unavailability of an equal protection claim in 1938 sug-

gests that Erie used the phrase solely in a broader, nonconstitutional
sense.

237 Erie, 304 U.S. at 72.
238 Id. at 77-78; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 234, § 5.3.5, at 314 ("Justice Brandeis
made it clear that the constitutional argument was integral to the Court's holding [in
Erie] ....").
239 See, e.g., John R. Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, I I Hous.

L. REv. 791, 795-96 (1974) (discussing the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component as a possible basis for the Court's decision in Erie).
240

Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.

241

Id. at 74, 77-78.

242 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 234, § 5.3.5, at 314 (stating that Erie's reference to
equal protection "appears to be a rhetorical rather than a constitutional argument
because the Supreme Court had not yet applied the requirements of equal protection
to the federal government"). On the development of equal protection jurisprudence, compare LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) (rejecting
an equality based challenge on the ground that "[t] he Fifth Amendment has no equal
protection clause"), with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (subjecting federal racial classification to equal protection scrutiny for the first time). See also
Bradford R. Clark, Note, JudicialReview of CongressionalSection Five Action: The Fallacy of
Reverse Incorporation, 84 COLUM. L. REV,. 1969, 1970-72 (1984) (discussing the origin
and development of reverse incorporation).

1l90

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8j:4

Finally, some might read Erie as resting on traditional notions of
limited federal power under the Tenth Amendment. 2 43 The Court's
opinion does, after all, contain various references to "'the autonomy
and independence of the States,' "24 4 the rights "reserved by the Constitution to the several States," 24 5 the limited matters "specifically authorized or delegated to the United States,

'246

and Congress's lack of

"power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State. ' 24 7 This reading of the opinion, however, is too simplistic. In
light of the Court's contemporaneous decisions broadly construing
the Commerce Clause, 248 it seems unlikely that Erie meant to suggest
that Congress lacked power to enact rules to govern the question
before the Court-i.e., the duty of care owed by an interstate railroad
to pedestrians walking along the right-of-way. In any event, any suggestion to this effect was dictum because Congress had not in fact en249
acted an applicable federal statute.
Looking beyond these explanations of the Erie opinion, one can
identify a deeper constitutional flaw with the Swift doctrine. Over
time, the doctrine evolved into little more than an excuse for federal
courts to exercise broad policymaking discretion on behalf of society
unchecked by the Constitution's carefully crafted lawmaking proce243 See Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 234, at 677; Benno Schmidt, Substantive Law
Applied by the Federal Courts-Effect of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 16 TEX. L. REV. 512,
520-24 (1938).
244 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401
(1893) (Field, J., dissenting)).
245 Id. at 80.
246 Id. at 79.
247 Id. at 78.
248 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (holding that Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause extends to certain intrastate activities that, in aggregate, affect interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 37 (1937) (holding that Congress has the power to exercise control over intrastate
activities that have a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce); Clark,
supra note 205, at 1258 (noting the Court's broad grant of federal authority in its
Commerce Clause cases and its contemporaneous denial of similar authority in Erie);
Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie -The Thread, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1682,
1684 n.10 (1974) (suggesting that Congress could have used its power under the
Commerce Clause to enact a rule of decision contrary to the result in Erie).
249 Chief Justice Stone, who joined the Erie opinion, apparently held this view:
"'[I] do not think it is at all clear that Congress could not apply (enact) substantive
rules of law to be applied by federal courts. I think that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
did not settle that question, notwithstanding some unfortunate dicta in the opinion."'
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FisE STONE 480-81 n.t (1956) (quoting Letter
from Harlan Stone to Owen J. Roberts (Jan. 3, 1941)); see also id. at 480 ("'Beyond
[the federal courts' unconstitutional assumption of powers] . . . it was unnecessary to
go."' (quoting Letter from Harlan Stone to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 29, 1938))).
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dures. Such discretion raised separation of powers concerns because
it allowed the life-tenured judiciary to encroach upon the authority of
Congress and the President. At the same time, such discretion raised
federalism concerns because it permitted federal courts to displace
state law outside the Supremacy Clause and the political safeguards of
federalism built into the constitutional structure to protect the governance prerogatives of the states. 250 By circumventing these safeguards, the expanded Swift doctrine amounted to "'an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United
States.' ",251
Erie's reasoning suggests that its animating principle was that
agents of the federal government have the power to override background principles of state law only if they follow one of the lawmaking
methods incorporated by the Supremacy Clause. In this way, the
Court upheld the structural safeguards built into those proceduresincluding the Founders' decision to give the Senate the right to participate in adopting (and therefore to veto) all forms of "the supreme
Law of the Land." Such safeguards, of course, were designed to prevent promiscuous and insufficiently considered displacement of state
law by federal actors. Erie ensured that the judiciary would not circumvent such safeguards by affirming that federal courts lack independent policymaking discretion to formulate rules of decision
capable of displacing state law.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that, in explaining how courts
applying the Swift doctrine "have invaded rights . .. reserved by the

Constitution to the several States,"'252 the Erie Court began by paraphrasing the Supremacy Clause: "Except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the State." 253 The Court's statement presupposes that the Supremacy Clause provides the exclusive basis in the
Constitution for displacing state law. 254 Under the Clause, the federal

government may displace state law only by successfully adopting an
250 See supra notes 67-91 and accompanying text.
251 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
252 Id. at 80.
253 Id. at 78. Of course, the Supremacy Clause refers not only to the "Constitution" and "Laws," but also to "Treaties." See U.S. CONs r. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ).
254 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 234 (2000) ("As the Supreme
Court and virtually all commentators have acknowledged, the Supremacy Clause is
the reason that valid federal statutes trump state law.").
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applicable provision of "[t] his Constitution," "the Laws of the United
States . . . made in Pursuance thereof," or "Treaties made . . . under
the Authority of the United States. ' 255 The Constitution, in turn,

prescribes three distinct sets of "finely wrought and exhaustively considered" 256 procedures to govern the adoption of each source of law
recognized by the Supremacy Clause. 257 These procedures assign federal lawmaking exclusively to the political branches of the federal government and the states. By design, federal courts were given no role
in the process. Erie acknowledged this omission by emphasizing that
"no clause in the Constitution purports to confer ... power upon the
federal courts"
ble in a State.

258
'25 9

"to declare substantive rules of common law applica-

The Swift doctrine undermined these features of the constitutional structure by allowing federal courts to displace state law unconstrained by federal lawmaking procedures, the political safeguards of
federalism, and the Supremacy Clause. In other words, the Swift doctrine was "unconstitutional" because it permitted judges to disregard
traditional principles of state law in favor of their own independent
notions of sound public policy. As Justice Field put it, the "general
law" applied by federal courts under the Swfi doctrine was "little less
than what the judge advancing the doctrine [thought] at the time
should be the general law on a particular subject." 260 Allowing federal
courts to exercise this degree of policymaking discretion was inconsistent with key aspects of the constitutional structure and interfered
with "'the autonomy and independence of the States.' "261 Thus, Erie
stressed that "[t] he common law so far as it is enforced in a State ... is

not the common law generally but the law" as declared by the courts
of that state. 262 As Henry Monaghan explained, "federal judicial
power to displace state law is not coextensive with the scope of dormant congressional power. Rather, the court must point to some
source, such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional provision, as author255 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
256 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
257 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring bicameral passage by the House and
Senate and presentment to the President before a bill "becomes a Law"); id. art. 1I,
§ 2, cl. 2 (authorizing the President and two-thirds of the Senate "to make Treaties");
id. art. V (authorizing two-thirds of the House and Senate and three-fourths of the
states to adopt "Amendments to this Constitution").

258

304 U.S. at 78.

259
260
261

Id.
Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field,J., dissenting).
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (quoting Baugh, 149 U.S. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting)).

262

Id. at 79.
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ity for the creation of substantive federal law."' 263 In the absence of
such authority, the exercise of judicial discretion to override state law
2 64
constitutes "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers."'
IV.

REASSESSING EIGHTH AMENDMENT DISCRETION

The Supreme Court's recent embrace of broad judicial discretion
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment raises many of the same concerns under the constitutional structure that previously led the Court to abandon both federal
common law crimes and the Swift doctrine. The Court now claims the
right to set aside traditional state law punishments in the name of the
Eighth Amendment based on the Justices' own "independent judgment" as to what constitutes "'the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.' "265 The Court has made no
attempt to ground this assertion of policymaking discretion in the text
or history of the Constitution, and apparently failed to consider the
structural considerations that led earlier Courts to abandon similar
doctrines of judicial discretion.
It is possible, of course, to imagine that the founders of a constitution might wish to confer broad policymaking discretion on judges
insulated from the political process. The question, however, is
whether inferring such a delegation is appropriate in contexts in
which our Constitution does not plainly grant it. As discussed, the
constitutional structure, key aspects of the ratification debates, and
several notable historical precedents all counsel against interpreting
ambiguous provisions of the Constitution to confer open-ended policymaking discretion upon federal courts. Such discretion would allow
the judiciary to exercise will instead of judgment and would undercut
263 Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. RE\,. 1, 11-12 (1975).
264 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &

Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting)). Of
course, there are other historical instances in which the Court first embraced broad
judicial discretion to set aside state law and then abandoned such discretion as illegitimate. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (invalidating a New York
law regulating the hours of bakers as inconsistent with the liberty of contract protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), abrogated by W.
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and Atkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525, 552 (1923) (invalidating a District of Columbia law establishing minimum wages
for women), overruled by W Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379, with W Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at

400 (overruling Atkins and upholding a state minimum wage law for women under
the Due Process Clause).
265 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
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the political safeguards of federalism built into the Supremacy Clause
and federal lawmaking procedures. In view of these structural considerations-reinforced over time by the settled understanding reflected
in the historical instances discussed above-proponents of broad judicial discretion under the Eighth Amendment bear the burden of establishing that the provisions in question unambiguously delegate
such authority to federal courts.
Article III is illustrative. Proponents of both federal common law
crimes and general common law under Swift simply assumed that Article III delegated authority to federal courts to embrace these doctrines. For example, in defending federal common law crimes, Justice
Story explained:
[T] he clause, that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law
and equity arising under the constitution," &c. is inexplicable, without reference to the common law; and the extent of this power must
be measured by the powers of courts of law and equity, and exer266
cised and established by that system.
Justice Story did not believe that federal courts would have discretion
to recognize any and all common law offenses. Rather, he assured
skeptics that judges would be constrained by "the principles of the
common law, taken in connexion with the constitution."' 267 This
meant that federal courts could recognize only "public offences" that
"when directed against the United States ... must upon principle be
deemed offences against the United States." 268 Under this standard,
Justice Story concluded that, "independent of any statute,"
treasons, and conspiracies to commit treason, embezzlement of the
public records, bribery and resistance of the judicial process, riots
and misdemeanors on the high seas, frauds and obstructions of the
public laws of trade, and robbery and embezzlement of the mail of
26 9
the United States, would be offences against the United States.
Likewise, in defending the Swift doctrine, serious scholars have
argued that by granting federal courts diversity jurisdiction, Article III
authorized federal courts to disregard "aberrational state laws" and
"creat[e] special substantive rules applicable in multistate cases. ' 270
266 United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
14,857), rev'd, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
267 Id. at 620.
268 Id.
269

Id. In such cases, Justice Story was convinced that "the common law can be

referred to, and made the rule of decision in criminal trials in the courts of the
United States." Id. at 621.
270

Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, The Rise of Legal Positiv-

ism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REv. 79, 81 (1993); see
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In essence, they believe that "Article III's purpose to provide a neutral
forum protecting nonresidents from discrimination justified Swift and
its progeny."' 27' At the same time, during the Swift era, the Supreme
Court maintained that its decisions were not based on the subjective
preferences of the justices, but rather on Article III's incorporation of
272
an objective body of "general law."
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Supreme Court ultimately
abandoned both federal common law crimes and the Swift doctrine as
inconsistent with the proper role of federal courts in the federal system. Although the open-ended language of Article III-"the judicial
Power"-can be read to encompass these doctrines, the Court found
this reading inadmissible because it would have conferred more discretion on federal courts than the constitutional structure suggests
they should exercise. 27 3 For example, notwithstanding Justice Story's
assurances, the Court ultimately agreed with Madison's objection that
Henry Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity ofJudge-Made State Law in State and Federal
Courts, 4 ILL. L. REv. 533, 537-38 (1910).

271 Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 234, at 683.
272 See Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 372-73 (1893); Burgess v.
Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883); Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517, 520-21
(1855).
273 One potential counterexample is federal common law-rules of decision that
purport to have the force of federal law, but whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of interpretation to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States. See Clark, supra note 205, at 1247. Even here, however, the Supreme Court
has rejected open-ended judicial lawmaking and attempted to limit federal common
law to "such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the
United States, interstate and international disputes ...,and admiralty cases." Tex.
Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). Many so-called federal common law rules, moreover, have arguably been mischaracterized and are actually "consistent with, and frequently required by, the constitutional structure." Clark, supra
note 205, at 1251; cf Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52
U. CHI. L. RE'. 1, 35 (1985) (suggesting that some federal common lawmaking-

"delegated" and "preemptive" lawmaking-is legitimate because authorized by Congress). Even admiralty-the most entrenched enclave of federal common law dating
back to Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)-has recently been called
into question. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 459 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Jensen and its progeny represent an unwarranted assertion ofjudicial authority to strike down or confine state
legislation.. . without any firm grounding in constitutional text or principle."); Clark,
supra note 205, at 1360 ("[T]hejudiciary's imposition of 'general maritime law' under
Jensen arguably intrudes upon the constitutional authority of Congress and the states
no less than the federal courts' application of 'general commercial law' under
Swif."); Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv'. 273, 279 (1999)
("[W]e would do better to follow Erie by largely abandoning the effort to construct
federal common law rules in admiralty cases that arise within state territorial
waters .... ).
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giving federal judges discretion to pick and choose among federal
' 274
common law crimes "would, in fact, erect them into legislators."
Similarly, Erie rejected as fallacy "the assumption that there is 'a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute.'- 275 Once this fallacy
was exposed, Erie saw the Swift doctrine as little more than an excuse
for judicial lawmaking, and declared that its application "invaded
rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the
several States." 276 The Court's resolution of these significant historical controversies suggests that unless the Constitution unambiguously
confers open-ended judicial discretion to displace state law, the constitutional structure precludes it.
The Supreme Court's recent Eighth Amendment precedent takes
a very different approach. Like proponents of federal common law
crimes and the Swift doctrine, the Court embraced broad judicial discretion in the name of a provision of the Constitution (in this case,
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause) without any specific textual or historical showing that the provision was, meant to delegate
such discretion. 277 Unlike earlier doctrines of judicial discretion,
however, the Court's recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence makes
no pretense about the nature of the discretion it assigns to judges.
Rather, the Justices now openly claim for themselves the right to depart from the "objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the
question," 2 78 in favor of their own independent judgment concerning
the morality, efficacy, and propriety of a given punishment in today's
society.

2 79

274 Madison, supra note 14, at 381.
275 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
276 Id. at 80. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several
States: Positivism and JudicialFederalism After Erie, 145 U.

PA.

L. REV. 1459, 1474-93

(1997).
277 One potential distinction between Roper and earlier doctrines of judicial discretion-such as the Swift doctrine and federal common law crimes-is that the former arose in the context of individual rights whereas the latter dealt with the
constitutional structure. Any such distinction, however, fails to address the structural
and historical case against broad judicial discretion. Moreover, the distinction is
anachronistic because the Founders understood the constitutional structure and the
Bill of Rights to be mutually reinforcing sources of individual liberty. See Clark, supra
note 92, at 333-48.
278

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).

279

See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
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Even assuming that the Court's assessment of these complex policy matters is correct, its assertion that the Eighth Amendment gives
federal judges open-ended discretion to make such judgments on behalf of society is at least questionable in light of the constitutional
structure. Echoing Swift-era dissents, today's dissenting Justices
charge that the Court has substituted "its own 'inevitably subjective
judgment' on how best to resolve this difficult moral question for the
' 28 0
judgments of the Nation's democratically elected legislatures.
Given that the constitutional structure takes great pains to channel
policymaking discretion to politically accountable officials constrained
by "finely wrought and exhaustively considered" procedures, 2 8 1 Jus-

tices should refrain from imposing their will on society unless the
Constitution unambiguously instructs them to do so.
One might argue that the Supreme Court's earlier precedents rejecting federal common law crimes and the Swift doctrine represent
little more than an interpretation of Article III as such. This reading,
however, ignores the broader structural underpinnings of those decisions. Although Article III had a direct bearing on these issues, both
the Court and the public saw the doctrines as raising fundamental
questions about the nature of judicial discretion under the constitutional structure. In denouncing federal common law crimes, for example, Madison warned that the doctrine "would confer on the
28 2
judicial department a discretion little short of a legislative power."
Similarly, in rejecting the doctrine, Justice Johnson objected that if
federal courts are free to adopt federal common law crimes, they must
"erect themselves into legislators in the selection." 2813

And, in de-

nouncing the Swift doctrine, Justice Field observed that the applicable
rules of decision were "little less than what the judge advancing the
doctrine [thought] at the time should be the general law on a particular subject." 284 In light of the Supremacy Clause and the associated

procedural safeguards of federalism, Erie rejected such discretion as
-an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United
280 Roper, 543 U.S. at 607 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854 (1988) (O'ConnorJ, concurring in the judgment)); see
also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Seldom has
an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of
its Members."); id. at 348 ("The arrogance of this assumption of power takes one's
breath away.").
281 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
282 Madison, supra note 14, at 380.
283 Trial of William Butler for Piracy 21 (C.C.D. S.C. 1813) (copy on file with the
Notre Dame Law Review).
284 Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field,J., dissenting).
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Given the systemic nature of the structural safeguards un-

derlying these decisions, it is difficult to conclude thatjudicial discretion asserted under other provisions is logically distinguishable from
analogous discretion previously claimed under Article III. Accordingly, the Court should not infer broad judicial discretion in the ab28 6
sence of an express constitutional delegation.
In this regard, it is significant that the Supreme Court's novel approach to the Eighth Amendment makes no attempt to justify the exercise of policymaking discretion by reference to either the text or
history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 28 7 My purpose
here is not to question that basic approach, but rather to identify the
appropriate set of background assumptions that the Court should
bring to bear from the overall constitutional structure when it is not
relying on the specific historical understanding of the Clause. In
other words, I take the Court's basic framework of evolving standards
of decency as my starting point and then ask which conception of that
framework better comports with the constitutional structure as a
whole. That effort, I should add, is not contradicted by the Amendment itself. It provides that "cruel and unusual punishments" shall
not be inflicted. 288 Although this is not the occasion to consider the
original understanding of that phrase, it is safe to say at least that the
Clause was drafted in sufficiently open-ended terms so as to allow the
285 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
286 Article V itself also tends to refute the case for any inherent distinction between judicial discretion under Article III and the Eighth Amendment. The
Supremacy Clause's reference to "[t]his Constitution" means that all provisions of
the original Constitution displace state law when the two conflict. Article V selfconsciously ensures that future amendments would also trigger the Clause by proclaiming that amendments adopted in accordance with its intricate and cumbersome
procedures "shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution." U.S.
CONST. art. V (emphasis added). In the abstract, therefore, it should matter little
whether courts claim discretion under Article III or a constitutional amendment. In
either case, courts must point to a clear delegation in order to overcome the implications of the Supremacy Clause and federal lawmaking procedures.
287 Of course, courts and commentators frequently disagree over how best to interpret and apply constitutional provisions adopted long ago in light of today's
changed circumstances.

Compare Lawrence Lessig,

Translating Federalism: United

States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 130 (arguing in favor of radical translation),
with Bradford R. Clark, TranslatingFederalism:A StructuralApproach, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1161, 1171 (1998) (suggesting courts should consider changed circumstances,
but adopt rules "consistent with the constitutional text").
288

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

2006]

STRUCTURE,

DISCRETION,

AND

THE EIGHTH

AMENDMENT

1199

Supreme Court some leeway in its interpretation. 28 9 The existence of
a range of permissible interpretations, however, does not mean that
the text will bear any construction. Thus, before invalidating a particular penalty, the Court must explain why it constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
In ascertaining whether a particular punishment is "cruel," the
Supreme Court looks to the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society. In order to harmonize this approach with the constitutional structure, the Court should return to
an objective test and give due deference to legislative judgments. The
Court's approach to the related question of proportionality is instructive. Although some justices dispute the existence of a proportionality
29 0
requirement under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
others apply "a 'narrow proportionality principle"' in noncapital
cases. 29 1 For example, in recently upholding California's "Three
Strikes and You're Out" law, justice O'Connor, joined by ChiefJustice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, signaled their willingness to invalidate a sentence only if it "'is grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the crime."' 29 2 This narrow approach was grounded in part on Justice
Kennedy's earlier concurrence insisting "'that proportionality review
be guided by objective factors.' ''293 Justice Kennedy stressed that
"'[0] ur federal system recognizes the independent power of a State to
articulate societal norms through criminal law.'"294 On this assumption, the best indicators of whether a particular punishment satisfies
evolving standards of decency are the laws adopted by the people's
elected representatives. In Roper, Justice Kennedy arguably aban289 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
290 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 20 (plurality opinion) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
291
996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
For an insightful examination of the origins of proportionality review, see Margaret
Raymond, "No Fellow inAmerican Legislation": Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of
Proportionality,30 NIr. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
292 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21 (quoting Rummel v.Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980)).
293 Id. at 23 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1101 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment)). The other principles identified by Justice Kennedy were "'the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological
schemes, [and] the nature of our federal system."' Id. (quoting Harmelin,501 U.S. at
1101).
294 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)); see id. at 1000
(" 'Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders
more severely than any other State."' (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282)).
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doned this approach by disregarding the judgment of twenty state legislatures concerning the propriety of the juvenile death penalty in
favor of his own independent judgment.
Of course, even if a punishment is "cruel," it must also be "unusual" to trigger scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme
Court often analyzes this issue by asking whether there is a "national
consensus" against the punishment in question. Because we have a
federal system with fifty states, there will almost always be some degree
of disagreement among the states regarding the proper uses of particular punishments. The mere fact that some states abandon a punishment does not necessarily render it "unusual" within the meaning of
the Amendment: At some point, however, a punishment may become
so rare that it satisfies this requirement. The crucial question, therefore, is how many states must abolish a punishment in order for a
court to find it "unusual" under the Clause?
Certainly, there is room for debate, but here again the constitutional structure may suggest a tentative answer. Because Article V requires the approval of three-fourths of the states to amend the
Constitution, construing ambiguous constitutional provisions to authorize courts to invalidate punishments based on the views of fewer
than three-quarters of the states would arguably contradict the spirit,
if not the letter, of Article V. As Henry Monaghan has explained, "Article V was designed to permit a very small number of states (currently
thirteen) containing but a fraction of the total national population to
block constitutional change." 295 From this perspective, it would be
odd to interpret the Eighth Amendment to invalidate a traditional
punishment when at least thirteen states continue to authorize the
29 6
practice.
In this regard, the Supreme Court's recent Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence arguably pays inadequate attention to both the constitutional text and the constitutional structure. As discussed, twenty
states continued to authorize the juvenile death penalty when the
Court invalidated the punishment as "cruel and unusual." 297 In light
of Article V and the implications of the constitutional structure, the
295

Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitu-

tional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L.

REV.

121, 125 (1996).

296 Of course, even if three-quarters of the states choose to abandon a particular
punishment, it does not automatically follow that they would vote to ratify a constitutional amendment prohibiting the practice nationwide. It is possible that some states
might want to retain their ability to reinstate the punishment in the future. Others
might wish to preserve the power of sister states to resolve such questions for
themselves.
297 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.

2006]

STRUCTURE,

DISCRETION,

AND

THE

EIGHTH AMENDMENT

1201

Court should have required a greater degree of consensus among the
states before invalidating the practice. Indeed, the Court's approach
seems to read the term "unusual" out of the Eighth Amendment altogether by claiming authority to invalidate punishments it finds penologically or morally deficient, regardless of how many states permit the
practice. 29 8 This degree ofjudicial discretion not only contradicts the
text, but also allows federal courts to exercise will instead ofjudgment
contrary to the implications of constitutionally prescribed lawmaking
procedures, the political safeguards of federalism, and the Supremacy
Clause.
For similar reasons, the constitutional structure suggests that the
Court's reliance on international law to displace state law was also
questionable. 299 In support of its decision to invalidate the juvenile
death penalty, the Court invoked several unratified international
agreements, including Article 37 of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, which prohibit the execution of juvenile
offenders. 300 The Constitution requires the concurrence of the President and two-thirds of the Senate to adopt a treaty. Presidents of both
parties and the Senate have consistently refused to adopt the Convention as a treaty partly because they wished to preserve the states' traditional control over the death penalty. 30 ' In addition, as Curtis Bradley
had pointed out, "the United States has indicated that, if and when it
does ratify these treaties, it will attach a reservation declining to agree
298 Vicki Jackson has suggested that the Roper Court may have invoked foreign law
to satisfy the "unusualness" requirement of the Eighth Amendment by "[d]escribing
the 'stark reality' that the United States was now virtually alone in formally approving
the death penalty for juveniles." Jackson, supra note 62, at 127 (quoting Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005)). Elsewhere, however, ProfessorJackson correctly
observes that "the structure of the Court's argument supports its description of the
use of foreign law as confirmatory, rather than integral to its analysis." Id. at 116 n.30.
299 Reliance on foreign law to interpret the Constitution may also implicate principles of democratic self-government under the Constitution. For example, Jed
Rubenfeld has observed that the "Constitution is supposed to reflect our own fundamental legal and political commitments-not a set of commitments that all civilized
nations must share," and that it is "the self-givenness of the Constitution, not its
universality, that gives it authority as law." Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2006 (2004).
300 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
301

See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and InternationalLaw, 52

DUKE

L.J. 485, 512 (2002) (noting that the United States has not ratified the Convention on
the Rights of the Child). See generally Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties,
Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000) (discussing the
United States' practice of ratifying international human rights treaties subject to reservations, understandings, and declarations designed to preserve the governance prerogatives of the states).
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This is a textbook example of

the political safeguards of federalism at work. The Court circumvented these safeguards to the extent that it relied on unratified-and
apparently unratifiable-provisions of international agreements to invalidate the juvenile death penalty. At least when the President and
the requisite proportion of the Senate have refused to adopt an international prohibition, the Court should respect the results of the politi303
cal process and disregard such prohibitions.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court now claims extraordinary authority under
the Eighth Amendment to exercise "independent judgment" to decide the propriety of a particular punishment on behalf of society.
Judicial discretion on this scale necessarily raises concerns related to
separation of powers and democratic legitimacy. But such discretion
also implicates various features of the constitutional structure-federal lawmaking procedures, the political safeguards of federalism, and
the Supremacy Clause-designed to preserve the governance prerogatives of the states. Without a stronger showing that the Eighth
Amendment confers this degree of judicial discretion, it appears that
the Court's current approach-like its earlier embrace of federal common law crimes and the Swift doctrine-permits courts to exercise will
rather than judgment and thus represents "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States."

30 4

302 Bradley, supra note 301, at 513.
303 See id. at 543 ("If a U.S. court disregarded the U.S. reservation and enforced
the juvenile death penalty provision, it would be treating as supreme law of the land a
treaty provision that had never been approved by the president and Senate.").
304 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).

